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I. INTRODUCTION 
 When a federal court grants an abstention-based dismissal in a diversity case, the court 
abdicates its strict duty to exercise its jurisdiction where that jurisdiction has been properly 
invoked.  Thus, a federal court may not dismiss a case on abstention grounds unless it concludes 
that "exceptional circumstances" require the dismissal.  When a federal court grants an 
abstention-based stay in a diversity case, however, the court does not violate its jurisdictional 
duty.  According to the Supreme Court, an abstention-based stay is merely a postponement of the 
exercise of jurisdiction.  Although the Court has characterized an abstention-based stay as a 
delay rather than an abdication of the jurisdictional exercise, the Court surprisingly has not 
approved the liberal use of such stays.  Instead, the Court has limited abstention-based stays, like 
abstention-based dismissals, to exceptional circumstances.   
 In the certification context, unlike the abstention context, the Court has never addressed 
the question whether a federal court violates its duty to exercise it jurisdiction when it grants a 
certification-based stay in a diversity case.  Several scholars have argued, however, that indeed 
certification in diversity cases constitutes an abdication of the jurisdictional duty.1 Likewise, 
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 1 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State 
Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1672, 1676, 1729-40 (2003) (arguing that "certification is inconsistent with the statutory 
diversity jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by Congress to the extent that it improperly allows state 
courts to hear cases that fall within the statutory grant"); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use 
2many of the federal circuit courts believe that a federal court surrenders its jurisdiction when it 
certifies an unsettled question of state law in a diversity case.2 Accordingly, these circuits 
restrict certification, like abstention, to exceptional circumstances.3
This Article argues that a federal court does not abdicate its duty to exercise its 
jurisdiction when it certifies in a diversity case; instead, the court merely postpones the exercise 
of its jurisdiction.  Thus, federal courts need not limit certification in diversity cases to 
exceptional circumstances.  To substantiate this argument, Part II of this article explains the 
pertinent abstention doctrines and the extension of abstention principles from suits for equitable 
relief to suits for damages.  Part II also explains the development of the Supreme Court's 
distinction between abstention-based dismissals and abstention-based stays.  Part III briefly 
describes certification, discusses the Supreme Court's certification case law, and establishes that 
the Court itself has distinguished certification from abstention.  Part IV then reviews the federal 
circuits' certification case law.  This survey shows that several circuits, without explanation, 
equate certification with abstention and therefore require exceptional circumstances before they 
will certify.   
 Part V synthesizes Parts II-IV and demonstrates that certification is distinguishable from 
abstention.  Specifically, Part V contends that, contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, 
abstention-based stays in diversity cases result in the relinquishment of jurisdiction because they 
entail a full round of litigation in a state court system and therefore require all or an essential part 
of the suit to be litigated in a state forum.  Consequently, abstention-based stays are the 
 
of Certification, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 305, 312 (1994) (arguing that certification results in "frustration of the 
constitutional grant of diversity and supplemental jurisdiction to the federal courts"); Brian Mattis, Certification of 
Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. Miami L. Rev. 717, 729-31 
(1969) (arguing that certification constitutes "an abdication of the responsibility imposed by Congress to adjudicate 
cases when federal jurisdiction has been properly invoked"). 
 2 See infra Part IV.A. 
 3 See infra Part IV.A.  
3functional equivalent of abstention-based dismissals.  In contrast, certification-based stays in 
diversity cases actually result in postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction because 
certification is simply a device that assists courts in the adjudicatory process.  Certification 
allows a federal court, in effect, to research a question of state law and does not require fact-
finding or application of law to facts.  Thus, because certification does not involve the abdication 
of duty, it is distinguishable from abstention.  Federal courts therefore should not employ 
abstention principles to restrict the use of certification.   
 Part VI briefly addresses several secondary factors that federal courts sitting in diversity 
consider in deciding whether to certify.  This Part concludes that at least some of these factors 
are highly relevant to the certification decision, and so it is these aspects of certification – not the 
exceptional circumstances requirement of abstention – to which the courts should turn their 
focus. 
II. ABSTENTION 
 When Congress enacted the jurisdictional statutes,4 it conferred upon the federal courts a 
"strict duty" to adjudicate controversies where their jurisdiction is properly invoked.5 This 
"duty" derives from the "undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, 
 
4 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) ("The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 
exclusive of interests and costs, and is between – (1) citizens of different States . . . ."); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) 
("Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the 
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to 
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 
pending."). 
 5 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 715 (1996); see also Colo. River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (stating that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . 
. to exercise the jurisdiction given them"); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) 
(referring to the "duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it"); Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234 
("The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience.  Its 
purpose was generally to afford to suitors an opportunity in such cases, at their option, to assert their rights in the 
federal rather than in the state courts."); Cohens v. State of Va., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no 
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."). 
4defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds."6
Nevertheless, the federal courts' obligation to decide cases is not "absolute."7 The Supreme 
Court has long held that federal courts have the power to abstain.8 When a federal court 
abstains, it either (1) declines to exercise its jurisdiction altogether by remanding a removed case 
to state court or dismissing the case outright,9 or (2) "postpones" the exercise of its jurisdiction 
by staying the federal proceedings and remitting the parties to a state trial court to start a new 
lawsuit in order to resolve an unsettled question of state law.10 Given the courts' rigorous duty, 
however, the power to abstain is limited to "'exceptional circumstances where the order to the 
parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.'"11 
6 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (citing Kline v. Burke 
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922). 
 7 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716. 
 8 See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814-17 (discussing the different categories of abstention and citing 
many cases in which the Supreme Court has approved of abstention).  There is a longstanding debate in the 
abstention literature as to whether the Supreme Court has validly held that federal courts have the power to abstain.  
Compare Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J. 
71 (1984) (arguing that abstention violates separation of powers principles), with David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985) (arguing that abstention "does not endanger, but rather protects, the 
principle of separation of powers" and "that the responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and 
should carry with it significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion in matters relating to federal 
jurisdiction").  See generally Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (arguing that "the boundaries of federal jurisdiction – and the authority to 
define that jurisdiction – evolve through a dialogic process of congressional enactment and judicial response); 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Honoring David Shapiro, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1891 (2004) (discussing the themes set forth in 
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985)).   This article does not purport to 
enter this particular debate.  Instead, this article assumes, based on Supreme Court precedent, that federal courts 
have the authority to abstain in certain circumstances. 
 9 See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (affirming a district court's dismissal of a 
complaint on abstention grounds); see also Meredith, 320 U.S. at 235 (citing numerous examples of abstention-
based dismissals). 
 10 See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31 (1959) (affirming a district 
court's stay of proceedings on abstention grounds); see also id. at 27 (discussing abstention-based stays).  See also 
Gerald M. Levin, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism,
111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 344, 346 (1963) ("When a federal court abstains, the litigants bring a separate action, often for 
declaratory judgment, in the appropriate state court . . . . Since the ultimate purpose of abstention is to secure an 
authoritative determination of state law, the litigants must then proceed to the final appellate court through the 
required tiers of the state judiciary."). 
 11 Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89); see also Quackenbush,
517 U.S. at 715 ("[F]ederal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise ‘exceptional 
circumstances, where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.") (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted); County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188-89 ("The doctrine of abstention, under 
which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and 
5A. ABSTENTION AND SUITS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF 
 The Court has "located the power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal 
courts 'sitting in equity'" to decline to exercise their jurisdiction.12 Thus, it is not surprising that 
the Court initially applied abstention principles to suits for equitable relief.  In these cases, the 
Court balanced the federal duty to decide cases against the state interests involved.  The Court 
approved of abstention only where it found that principles of federal-state comity dictated that all 
or part of the dispute should be resolved in a state court.   
 For example, in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,13 the Court ruled that the 
district court should have abstained in a federal constitutional case involving the interpretation of 
an ambiguous state statute.14 In Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission ordered that all 
sleeping cars on trains must be operated by Pullman conductors.15 At that time, all of the 
conductors were white.16 The Pullman Company and the affected railroads sued in federal court 
to enjoin the Commission's order.17 The Pullman porters, who were all black, intervened in the 
suit as plaintiffs.18 The plaintiffs argued that the Commission's order violated a Texas statute 
and the United States Constitution.19 
The Supreme Court found that under Texas law, it was unclear whether the state statute at 
issue authorized the Commission's order.20 Instead of interpreting Texas law itself, the Court 
 
narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.  Abdication of the 
obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order 
to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest."). 
 12 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718; see also id. at 717 ("[I]t has long been established that a federal court 
has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of 
equity.’  This tradition . . . explains the development of our abstention doctrines.") (internal citations omitted). 
 13 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
 14 See generally id. 
15 Id. at 497-98. 
 16 Id. at 497. 
 17 Id. at 498. 
 18 Id. at 497-98. 
 19 Id. 
20 Id. at 497, 499. 
6remanded the case to the district court with instructions to stay the federal proceedings and remit 
the parties to state court to obtain an authoritative interpretation of Texas law from the Texas 
courts.21 The Court based its decision on "important considerations of policy in the 
administration of federal equity jurisdiction."22 The Court reasoned that if the state courts found 
that the Commission violated state law by issuing its order, the litigation would end.23 Thus, by 
sending the parties to state court, the federal court would have avoided adjudicating a 
"substantial constitutional issue" that "touch[ed] a sensitive area of social policy" or issuing an 
injunction against the order of a state agency.24 On the other hand, if the state court found that 
the Commission's order violated state law, the parties could return to federal court for 
adjudication of the constitutional issues.25 The district court would no longer be faced with 
issuing a "premature constitutional" ruling based on unclear state law, but instead could issue a 
decision that would not later be mooted by a state court's interpretation of the statute.26 
According to the Court, abstention under the circumstances in Pullman demonstrated 
"'scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth 
working of the federal judiciary."27 Thus, the court's use of its equitable discretion to stay the 
federal constitutional litigation and obtain clarification of state law "further[ed] the harmonious 
relation between state and federal authority."28 
21 See id. at 501-02. 
 22 Id. at 501. 
 23 See id. at 498, 501-02. 
 24 See id. at 498, 500-02. 
 25 See id. at 501. 
 26 See id. at 499-500 ("The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is 
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.  The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that 
will avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication.").  
 27 See id. at 501. 
 28 Id. 
7Similarly, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,29 a case decided two years after Pullman, the 
Supreme Court upheld a district court's decision to abstain based on considerations of federal-
state comity.  In Burford, the Texas Railroad Commission issued a permit to G.E. Burford to drill 
four oil wells.30 Sun Oil Company and The Magnolia Petroleum Company then sued the 
Railroad Commission, Burford and another oil company in federal district court, seeking 
cancellation of the permit or, in the alternative, an injunction to prevent operation of the wells.31 
The "principal issue" was whether the Commission's order was reasonable.32 Texas had 
developed a "complex administrative system"33 to address such claims, and thus had 
"demonstrated [an] interest in maintaining uniform review of the Commission's orders."34 
Nevertheless, "the federal courts had, in the years preceding Burford, become increasingly 
involved in reviewing the reasonableness of the Commission's orders."35 
The district court held that the suit should be brought in a state forum and dismissed the 
case.36 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court had properly declined to 
exercise its jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.37 The Court 
identified a number of "unique" grounds that favored dismissal38 and reasoned that dismissal 
"was appropriate because the availability of an alternative, federal forum threatened to frustrate 
the purpose of the complex administrative system that Texas had established" to adjudicate the 
 
29 319 U.S. 315 (1943).  
 30 Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1941), vacated, 130 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1942), rev’d en 
banc, 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
 31 Id. 
32 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 723 (1996) (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 317). 
 33 See id. (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 332). 
 34 Id. at 724.  
 35 Id. at (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 326, 327). 
 36 Sun Oil Co., 124 F.2d at 468. 
 37 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334. 
 38 In Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 725, a case decided fifty-three years after Burford, the Court explained that 
it "approved the District Court's dismissal of the complaint [in Burford] on a number of grounds that were unique to 
that case," including (1) "the difficulty of the regulatory issues presented," (2) "the demonstrated need for uniform 
regulation in the area," and (3) "[m]ost importantly, . . . the detrimental impact of ongoing federal court review of 
the Commission's orders, which . . . had already led to contradictory adjudications by the state and federal courts." 
8type of claims at issue in Burford.39 Thus, as in Pullman, the Court found that "a sound respect 
for the independence of state action require[d] the federal equity court to stay its hand."40 
In contrast to its decisions in Pullman and Burford, in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven41 
the Supreme Court held that an appellate court improperly exercised its discretion to abstain.  
The plaintiffs in Meredith owned bonds that had been issued and were redeemable by the City of 
Winter Haven, Florida.42 They brought suit in federal district court, seeking both declaratory and 
injunctive relief, to prevent the City from redeeming the bonds without paying interest.43 The 
court's jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, and the only issues in the case involved 
the proper interpretation of Florida law.44 
The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action under 
Florida law and dismissed the complaint.45 The court of appeals concluded that the applicable 
Florida constitutional and statutory law was uncertain and therefore ordered that the case be 
dismissed without prejudice so that the plaintiffs could proceed in state court.46 The Supreme 
Court framed the question before it as whether the appellate court "rightly declined to exercise its 
 
39 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 725 (citing Burford, 319 U.S. at 332).  In Burford, the plaintiffs invoked 
federal jurisdiction on both diversity and federal question grounds.  319 U.S. at 317.  In addition to their state law 
claim, the plaintiffs asserted that the Commission's order violated the U.S. Constitution.  Id. Thus, the dismissal in 
Burford "had the effect of avoiding a federal constitutional issue."  Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 815 n.21.  Nevertheless, 
the presence of the federal question in Burford, "was not an additional ground for abstention."  Id. 
 40 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334. 
 41 320 U.S. 228 (1943). 
 42 Id. at 229-30. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 230. 
 46 Id. 
9jurisdiction" because the case turned on unclear Florida law.47 The Court concluded that the 
dismissal was improper, reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and remanded the case.48 
The Meredith Court opined that, given the federal courts' strict duty to exercise their 
jurisdiction, they cannot decline to do so "merely because the answers to the questions of state 
law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court of the state."49 
Thus, the Meredith Court held that unlike the prior cases in which it had approved abstention, 
there were no exceptional circumstances present in the case at bar that justified an abstention-
based dismissal.50 In contrast to Pullman and Burford, Meredith did not involve a federal 
constitutional question that could be mooted by remitting the parties to state court51 or 
"interference with [state] agencies or with the state courts."52 It simply involved uncertain 
Florida law regarding the extent of the City's liability on the bonds. 
 Moreover, the Meredith Court emphasized that the purpose of the diversity statute is to 
give litigants "an opportunity. . . to assert their rights in the federal rather than in the state 
courts."53 The Court explained that to deny the plaintiffs this option absent exceptional 
circumstances "would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act,"54 further delay the litigation,55 
and penalize the plaintiffs without justification for invoking diversity jurisdiction.56 Finally, the 
 
47 Id. at 229. 
 48 Id. at 238. 
 49 Id. at 234. 
 50 Id. at 236. 
 51 Id. at 236 (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. 496). 
 52 Id. at 237. 
 53 Id. at 234.  
 54 Id. at 234-35; see also id. at 237 ("We are pointed to no public policy or interest which would be served 
by withholding from petitioners the benefit of the jurisdiction which Congress has created with the purpose that it 
should be availed of and exercised subject only to such limitations as traditionally justify courts in declining to 
exercise the jurisdiction which they possess."). 
 55 Id. at 237.  
 56 Id. ("To remit the parties to the state courts is to delay further the disposition of the litigation which has 
been pending for more than two years and which is now ready for decision.  It is to penalize [plaintiffs] for resorting 
to a jurisdiction which they were entitled to invoke, in the absence of any special circumstances which would 
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Court recognized that while only Florida's highest court could "settle" the state law questions 
involved, the federal courts could at least "adjudicate the rights of the parties" before them.57 
B. ABSTENTION AND SUITS FOR DAMAGES 
 Although the Court first applied abstention principles to suits for equitable relief, the 
court has not limited abstention to such suits.58 Instead, the Court has permitted federal courts to 
abstain from exercising their jurisdiction whenever they have discretion to grant or deny relief.59 
Abstention principles consequently apply not only in suits for injunctive relief, but also in 
declaratory judgment actions.60 Moreover, the Court has further extended abstention principles 
to common law suits for damages.61 
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,62 for example, the City of Thibodaux, 
Louisiana filed a petition in Louisiana state court "asserting a taking of the [Power and Light 
Company's] land, buildings, and equipment."63 The defendant removed the case to federal 
district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship64 and sought compensation for the taking.65 
A Louisiana statute appeared to permit the taking, but the statute had never been interpreted by 
 
warrant a refusal to exercise it."); see also County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 196-97 ("To order [the plaintiffs] out of 
the federal court [absent exceptional circumstances] would accomplish nothing except to require still another 
lawsuit, with added delay and expense for all parties. . . . It exacts a severe penalty from citizens for their attempt to 
exercise rights of access to the federal courts granted them by Congress to deny them 'that promptness of decision 
which in all judicial actions is one of the elements of justice.'"). 
 57 See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 238. 
 58 See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718. 
 59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. This Article uses the phrases "damages action, "suit for damages," and "suits at law" (as well as 
other variations of these phrases) interchangeably to refer to suits seeking monetary relief as opposed to equitable 
relief.  See Lewis Yelin, Burford Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1871, 1873 n. 10 (1999) 
("One common way of distinguishing equitable actions from actions at law is that, in the former, the court has 
discretion to adapt its relief to the circumstance of the case, while in the latter, the relief afforded is normally money 
damages.")  Although this "distinction is too simpl[istic], it will "suffice for present purposes."  See id. ("This 
distinction is too simple . . . since relief in a common-law action seeking issuance of a prerogative writ (such as 
mandamus or prohibition) is discretionary."). 
 62 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
 63 Id. at 26. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 720. 
11
Louisiana courts.66 At the same time, the Attorney General had issued an opinion in another 
"strikingly similar" case stating that such takings were prohibited.67 Given the uncertainty in 
Louisiana law, the district judge stayed the proceedings until the Louisiana Supreme Court had 
"been afforded an opportunity to interpret" the statute at issue.68 The Fifth Circuit reversed, but 
the Supreme Court concluded that the district court had properly exercised its discretion to stay 
the suit "pending the institution of a declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana."69 Thus, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and reinstated the 
district court's stay order.70 
The Court first recognized that the case before it was a suit "at law" seeking damages and 
that its prior abstention cases were suits in equity.71 The Court stated, however, that its prior 
abstention cases "did not apply a technical rule of equity procedure."72 Instead, they were based 
on considerations of federal-state comity.73 Thus, the Court explained, it previously had 
approved abstention where it was necessary to avoid "serious disruption by federal courts of state 
government or needless friction between state and federal authorities."74 The Court concluded 
that even though the case at bar was a damages action, abstention was appropriate.75 It reasoned 
that because the suit involved eminent domain, a subject that is "intimately involved with [a 
state's] sovereign prerogative,"76 abstention was warranted to maintain "harmonious federal-state 
 
66 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 26. 
 69 Id. at 30. 
 70 Id. 
71 See id. at 35. 
 72 Id. at 28.  
 73 Id. at 34. 
 74 Id. at 28.  
 75 See id. at 30.  
 76 Id. at 28. 
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relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State."77 Thus, the Court applied 
abstention principles to a suit for damages and reinstated the district court's stay order.78 
In upholding the district court's order, the Court emphasized that the lower court "had 
only stayed the federal suit pending adjudication of the dispute in state court," rather than 
dismissing the suit as the Burford Court had done.79 The Court explained that the district court 
would continue to participate in the litigation because once the state court interpreted the statute, 
the case would be returned to district court.80 If the state courts upheld the taking, then the 
district court would "award compensation."81 Furthermore, if the parties did not file and obtain a 
declaratory judgment in a timely fashion, then "the District Court, having retained complete 
control of the litigation, [would] doubtless assert it to decide . . . the question of the meaning of 
the state statute."82 
By stressing that the district court had merely stayed the proceedings, the Thibodaux 
Court recognized the distinction between an abstention-based stay and an abstention-based 
remand or dismissal.83 Traditionally, courts lacked discretionary power to decline to exercise 
 
77 Id. at 29.  As one commentator has explained, "The Supreme Court's focus on comity as the most 
essential component in the balance of federal/state interests for federal abstention purposes has allowed [the] Court 
to expand the equitable doctrine of abstention to cover suits seeking damages as well as those seeking equitable 
relief."  Stephanie Dest, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default: An Abstention-Based Interest 
Analysis, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 278 (1989). 
 78 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30.  In upholding the district court's stay order, the Supreme Court also 
recognized that the Louisiana state courts were "the only tribunal[s] empowered to speak definitively" on the 
meaning of the eminent domain statute at issue.  Id. at 29.  The district court could only "make a dubious and 
tentative forecast" as to the proper interpretation of the statute.  Id. Thus, if the federal courts interpreted and 
applied the statute in the case at bar, then it "would be the only case in which the Louisiana statute [was] construed 
as  [the federal courts] would construe it, whereas the rights of all other litigants would be thereafter governed by a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana different from [the federal courts']."  Id. at 30. 
 79 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29). 
 80 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29. 
 81 Id. 
82 Id. 
 83 See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.  Indeed, the Thibodaux Court distinguished Meredith on the ground 
that Meredith involved an abstention-based dismissal, while Thibodaux involved an abstention-based stay.  The 
Thibodaux Court characterized the issue in Meredith as "whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court" 
due to uncertain state law, while the issue in Thibodaux was whether the district judge should be prohibited from 
instituting a stay order to seek an interpretation of unclear state law from the Louisiana courts.  360 U.S. at 28 n.2.  
13
their jurisdiction in suits "at law" except in very limited circumstances and therefore typically 
could not dismiss common law damages actions.84 Thus, by analogy, an abstention-based 
remand to state court in Thibodaux would have been improper because the defendant sought 
compensation for the taking.85 According to the Court, however, the stay in Thibodaux was 
acceptable because a stay, unlike a dismissal, does "not constitute abnegation" by a federal court 
of its duty to decide the case before it.86 Instead, a stay merely postpones the court's exercise of 
its duty to adjudicate the controversy until a later time.87 Thus, while an abstention-based 
remand in Thibodaux would have represented an inappropriate abdication of duty, the district 
court's abstention-based stay order was a "wise and productive discharge" of its duty to exercise 
jurisdiction.88 
The Court concluded that a district court properly exercises its discretionary power when it stays proceedings in 
order to clarify state law, but not when it dismisses a case for the same reason.  See id. at 28 & n.2, 29. 
 84 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721. 
 85 See Quackenbush, 517 at 722.  
 86 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29.  
 87 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 719 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29) (emphasis added). 
 88 Id. at 721 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29).  See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 
593 (1968) (per curiam); County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 188.  In 1968, the Court decided Kaiser Steel, a case very 
similar to Thibodaux. In Kaiser, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court under diversity jurisdiction claiming illegal 
trespass by the defendant and seeking damages.  Id. at 593.  The defendant conceded that it had trespassed, but 
claimed that a state statute permitted the trespass for the purpose of using water rights the state had granted to it.  Id. 
Because state law was unclear and the same issues were pending before the state courts in a declaratory judgment 
suit, the defendant requested a stay until the state courts clarified the law.  See id. at 593-94.  Both the district court 
and the court of appeals denied the defendant's motion to stay.  Id. at 594.   
The Supreme Court reversed in a brief per curiam opinion.  Id. at 593-94.  The Court reasoned that "[t]he 
state law issue [was] . . . of vital concern in the arid State of New Mexico, where water is one of the most valuable 
natural resources.  The issue, moreover, [was] a truly novel one.  The question [would] eventually have to be 
resolved by the New Mexico courts, and since a declaratory judgment action [was] actually pending there, in all 
likelihood that resolution [would] be forthcoming soon.  Sound judicial administration requires that the parties in 
this case be given the benefit of the same rule of law which will apply to all other businesses and landowners 
concerned with the use of this vital state resource."  Id. at 594.  Thus, the Court remanded the case "with directions 
that the action be stayed."  Id. The Court concluded its opinion by stating, "Federal jurisdiction will be retained in 
the District Court in order to insure a just disposition of this litigation should anything prevent a prompt state court 
determination."  Id. 
Like Thibodaux, Kaiser was a suit for damages.  Thus, the abstention-based stay ordered by the Court in 
Kaiser, like the stay in Thibodaux, was proper because it would merely postpone the district court's exercise of its 
jurisdiction.  By staying the proceedings, the district court would not improperly abdicate its duty to decide as it 
would if it dismissed the case and remitted the parties to state court. 
County of Allegheny, unlike Thibodaux and Kaiser, involved an abstention-based dismissal by a district 
court in a diversity suit for damages.  In County of Allegheny, the Allegheny County Board of Commissioners 
appropriated the plaintiffs' property under the applicable state eminent domain statutes and then leased the property 
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Thirty-seven years later in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., the Supreme Court directly 
confronted the question whether federal courts can exercise their discretion to remand or dismiss 
suits for damages, as opposed to those for discretionary relief, on abstention grounds.89 In 
Quackenbush, the California insurance commissioner sued Allstate Insurance Company in state 
court "seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate's alleged breach of certain reinsurance 
agreements, as well as a general declaration of Allstate's obligations under those agreements."90 
Invoking diversity jurisdiction, Allstate removed the case and filed a motion to compel 
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.91 The commissioner then moved for remand, 
arguing that the district court should abstain under Burford because its resolution of the case 
might interfere with California's regulation of the insurance industry.92 Specifically, the 
Commissioner indicated that there was "a hotly disputed question of state law" involved in the 
case, and that this question was already pending before the state courts.93 
to a company for "its private business use."  Id. at 187.  The plaintiffs brought suit in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction alleging that settled state law prohibited the taking of private property for private, rather than public, 
use.  Id. at 187-88.  They sought ouster of the County and the company from the property, as well as damages.  
Although the suit sought damages, the district court in County of Allegheny, in contrast to the district court in 
Thibodaux, dismissed the suit "on the ground that it 'should not interfere with the administration of the affairs of a 
political subdivision acting under color of State law in a condemnation proceeding.'"  Id. at 188.  The Third Circuit 
reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.   
Thus, while the Court upheld an abstention-based stay in Thibodaux, an eminent domain case where 
damages were sought, it would not approve an abstention-based dismissal in County of Allegheny, also an eminent 
domain case where damages were sought.  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 720 (distinguishing “between abstention-based 
remand orders or dismissals and abstention-based decisions merely to stay adjudication of a federal suit.”).  
Furthermore, while Thibodaux and Kaiser are distinguishable because they involved stays while County of 
Allegheny involved a dismissal, they also differ from County of Allegheny in that they involved unclear issues of 
state law while the state law in County of Allegheny was settled.  Id. at 720-21; see also Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 31 
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("[S]ince the controlling state law is clear and only factual issues need be resolved, there is 
no occasion in the interest of justice to refrain from prompt adjudication.”). 
 89 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 706.  
 90 Id. at 709.  
 91 Id. 
92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
15
In contrast to the district court in Thibodaux, the district court in Quackenbush remanded 
the case to state court on Burford abstention grounds even though it was a suit for damages.94 
The district court primarily was concerned that the state and federal courts might rule differently 
on the disputed issue of state law and thereby produce inconsistent decisions.95 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed,96 and the Supreme Court affirmed.97 The Court concluded that abstention-
based remands or dismissals of damages actions are an improper use of the federal courts' 
discretionary power; however, federal courts may apply abstention principles to stay damages 
proceedings.98 Because the case at bar was a suit for damages, "the District Court's remand order 
was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine."99 
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that it had long held that federal courts may 
dismiss cases where equitable relief is sought and exceptional circumstances are present.100 The 
Court also acknowledged that over time it has expanded the power of federal courts to decline to 
exercise their jurisdiction to all cases in which discretionary relief is sought and exceptional 
circumstances are present.101 The Court pointed out, however, that in prior abstention cases 
where damages were sought, it had only permitted the federal court "to enter a stay order that 
postpones adjudication of the dispute, not to dismiss the federal suit altogether."102 Quoting 
Thibodaux, the Court again explained that "an order merely staying the action 'does not 
 
94 Id. at 710. 
 95 Id. at 709-10. 
 96 Id. at 710. 
 97 Id. at 711. 
 98 Id. at 721.  
 99 Id. at 731. 
 100 Id. at 716.  
 101 Id. at 718.  
 102 Id. at 719 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28-30). 
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constitute abnegation of judicial duty.  On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of 
it.  There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition.'"103 
Thus, the Quackenbush Court confirmed that in suits "at law," federal courts do not have 
the power to remand or dismiss on abstention grounds.104 If they take such action in suits for 
damages, they improperly abdicate their duty to exercise their jurisdiction.105 Federal courts do, 
however, have the power to "apply[] abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay" and 
send the parties to state court for resolution of a state law issue.106 A stay in a suit at law, in 
contrast to a remand or dismissal, does not constitute the "abnegation of judicial duty"; a stay is 
merely a postponement of adjudication.107 
C. ABSTENTION TODAY  
 Federal courts abstain only in exceptional circumstances.108 They do so "out of deference 
to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and 
federalism."109 The Court has recognized that under its abstention case law, various types of 
abstention exist.110 While the Court has warned that the abstention doctrines "are not rigid 
pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases,"111 there are nevertheless separate 
categories of abstention today.  Three of these categories – Pullman abstention, Thibodaux 
 
103 Id. at 721 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29). 
 104 Id. 
105 See id. 
106 Id. at 730.  
107 Id. at 721.  The Quackenbush Court stated at the end of its opinion that because it was deciding only the 
question of whether the district court's dismissal was appropriate, it was "unnecessary to determine whether a more 
limited abstention-based stay order would have been warranted on the facts of [the] case."  Id. at 731.  Nevertheless, 
the Court speculated that "Burford might support a federal court's decision to postpone adjudication of a damages 
action pending the resolution by the state courts of a disputed question of state law."  Id. at 730.  The Court reasoned 
that it might have been appropriate for the district court to enter a stay in the case at bar given the disputed issue of 
state law involved "and in the interest of avoiding inconsistent adjudications on that point."  Id. at 731. 
108 Id. at 716. 
109 Id. at 723. 
110 See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813-817 (Supreme Court "decisions have confined the circumstances 
appropriate for abstention to three general categories."). 
111 New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 359-60. 
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abstention, and Burford abstention – are pertinent to this Article, and they are summarized 
below.112 
First, federal courts abstain under Pullman "'in cases presenting a federal constitutional 
issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of 
pertinent state law.'"113 When a federal court abstains in these circumstances, it stays the 
proceedings in federal court even though the plaintiff typically seeks equitable relief and the 
court therefore has the discretionary power to dismiss.  The court does so in order to preserve the 
federal constitutional issue for decision in a federal forum.114 
Pullman abstention is inappropriate, however, when state law is clear.115 In addition, it is 
improper when the statute at issue is not "'fairly subject to an interpretation which will render 
 
112 The other two main categories of abstention are Younger abstention and Colorado River abstention.  
When federal courts engage in Younger abstention, they refrain "from hearing cases that would interfere with a 
pending state criminal proceeding, or with certain types of state civil proceedings."  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716 
(citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 
U.S. 327 (1977)).  When federal courts engage in Colorado River abstention, they "refrain from hearing cases . . . 
which are duplicative of a pending state proceeding."  Id. at 717 (citing Colo. River, 424 U.S. 800; Pennsylvania v. 
Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935)).  The Court has also approved of abstention in "cases whose resolution by a federal 
court might unnecessarily interfere with a state system for the collection of taxes."  Id. (citing Great Lakes Dredge 
& Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943)). 
113 Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814 (quoting County of Allegheny, 360 U.S. at 189).  As Judge Friendly 
explained, "One type of case almost universally recognized as appropriate for abstention is that of a state statute, not 
yet construed by the state courts, which is susceptible of one construction that would render it free from federal 
constitutional objection and another that would not.  A federal court should not place itself in the position of holding 
the statute unconstitutional by giving it the latter construction, only to find that the highest court of the state will 
render the decision futile and unnecessary by adopting the former.  Such a decision not only is a waste of judicial 
resources but provokes a needless collision between state and federal power."  Henry J. Friendly, Federal 
Jurisdiction: A General View 93 (1973). 
114 See, e.g., Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501 (stating that the district court should not abstain unless the 
constitutional claim could be fully protected while the state law issue was resolved in state court); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1980) ("Where a plaintiff properly invokes federal-court jurisdiction in the first instance on a 
federal claim, the federal court has a duty to accept that jurisdiction.  Abstention may serve only to postpone rather 
than to abdicate[] jurisdiction, since its purpose is to determine whether resolution of the federal question is even 
necessary, or to obviate the risk of a federal court's erroneous construction of state law."); Eng. v. La. State Bd. of 
Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 464 (1964) (stating that compelling a litigant who properly asserts federal 
constitutional claims in a federal district court to have those claims decided by a state court "would be at war with 
the unqualified terms in which Congress, pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred specific categories 
of jurisdiction upon the federal courts" and with the duty of federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction when it is 
properly invoked). 
115 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 469 (1987). 
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unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question.'"116 Even if the state 
courts have never interpreted the statute, a federal court should not abstain under Pullman "[i]f 
the statute is not obviously susceptible of a limiting construction."117 
Second, federal courts abstain under Thibodaux when a case "rais[es] issues 'intimately 
involved with [the States'] sovereign prerogative,' the proper adjudication of which might be 
impaired by unsettled questions of state law."118 At least in diversity cases, however, abstention-
based remands or dismissals based solely on unclear state law are not permitted under 
Thibodaux.119 
Finally, federal courts abstain under Burford when "the State's interests in maintaining 
uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem, and retaining local control over 
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import" outweigh 
"the strong federal interest in having certain classes of cases, and certain federal rights, 
adjudicated in federal court."120 While there is no "formulaic test for determining when 
dismissal under Burford is appropriate,"121 the exercise of discretion must, as with the other 
abstention doctrines, "reflect 'principles of federalism and comity.'"122 
116 Id. at 468 (quoting Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965)). 
117 Id. 
118 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716-17 (citing Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28); see also Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 
814 (citing Thibodaux and Kaiser for the proposition that abstention is "appropriate where there have been presented 
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends 
the result in the case then at bar"). 
119 See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 816 (citing Meredith, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) ("[T]he mere potential for 
conflict in the results of adjudications, does not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction.")). 
120 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
Burford abstention is sometimes placed in the same category as Thibodaux abstention.  See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 
814-15 (discussing Burford abstention in the same category as Thibodaux abstention).  But see New Orleans Public 
Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 359-60 ("While we acknowledge that the various types of abstention are not rigid 
pigeonholes into which the federal courts must try to fit cases, the policy considerations supporting Burford are 
sufficiently distinct to justify independent analyses.") (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).  
121 Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 727. 
122 Id. at 727-28 (quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)).  In dicta, the Quackenbush Court 
concluded that Burford abstention was inappropriate on the facts of that case.  Id. at 731.  The Court reasoned that 
federal interests were strong, while the state interests were comparatively weak.  Specifically, "Allstate's motion to 
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act implicate[d] a substantial federal concern for the enforcement 
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When a federal court decides that a case falls into one of the abstention categories and 
abstention is appropriate, the court must also decide whether to grant an abstention-based 
dismissal or remand or an abstention-based stay.  To make this decision, the court must consider 
the type of relief sought in the case.  As the Quackenbush Court explained, "in cases where the 
relief being sought is equitable in nature or otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have 
the power to stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also, in otherwise appropriate 
circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction altogether by either dismissing the suit or 
remanding it to state court."123 In damages actions, however, federal courts do not have the 
power to dismiss or remand based on abstention principles.124 They can only postpone the 
exercise of their jurisdiction by entering an abstention-based stay and remitting the parties to 
state court.125 
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND CERTIFICATION  
 While the Supreme Court has approved of abstention-based stays, it also has recognized 
that sending the parties to state court to endure "a full round of litigation"126 is costly for both the 
judicial system and the litigants.  Thus, the Court has endorsed the use of certification in at least 
 
of arbitration agreements." Id. at 708.  On the state interest side of the equation, however, the case appeared "to 
present nothing more than a run-of-the-mill contract dispute."  Id. at 729.  Furthermore, by the time the case reached 
the Supreme Court, the "hotly contested" issue of state law had been resolved by the California Supreme Court.  Id. 
at 729.  Consequently, there was no longer a concern that the federal and states courts would rule inconsistently on 
the issue.  See id. at 729-30.  Thus, the Court concluded "that the District Court's remand order was an unwarranted 
application of the Burford doctrine."  Id. at 731.  The Court acknowledged, however, that because it was deciding 
only whether the district court's abstention-based dismissal in a damages suit was proper, it did not "find it necessary 
to inquire fully as to whether this case presents the sort of 'exceptional circumstance' in which Burford abstention or 
other grounds for yielding federal jurisdiction might be appropriate."  Id. 
123 Id. at 721. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. at 76. 
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some federal question cases and in diversity suits.127 Certification is a "procedure" that allows a 
federal court faced with an unsettled issue of state law to stay its proceedings and "put the 
question directly to the State's highest court."128 In contrast to abstention, it "does not require 
litigating a new lawsuit through state appellate review."129 As a result, it is both faster and less 
expensive than granting an abstention-based stay.130 In addition, because certified questions are 
sent directly to a state's highest court, certification "increase[es] the assurance of gaining an 
authoritative response" from the only court that can provide one.131 Accordingly, "certification 
of novel or unsettled questions of state law . . . may save 'time, energy, and resources and hel[p] 
build a cooperative judicial federalism.'"132 
Today, almost all states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico permit 
certification.133 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has employed certification in federal 
question cases.134 In the federal question context, the Court has provided some guidance to the 
lower courts regarding when certification is appropriate.  Specifically, the Court has suggested 
that certification is warranted in a federal question case where Pullman abstention otherwise 
 
127 See infra Part III.A. and B. 
 128 Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76.  For a discussion of the history of certification and an 
overview of the certification procedure, see Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress's 
Power to Direct State Judicial Action: Congress's Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of 
State Law, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 649, 650-59 (1999). 
 129 Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New 
York, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 381 (2000). 
130 Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 77 (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)). 
 133 Only two states, Arkansas and North Carolina, do not have a certification procedure.  While Missouri 
has a certification statute, Mo. Stat. Ann. § 477.004 (Vernon Supp. 2006), the Missouri Supreme Court has declined 
to answer certified questions on the ground that the Missouri Constitution does not permit it to do so.  See Zeman v. 
V.F. Factory Outlet, Inc., 911 F.2d 107, 109 (8th Cir. 1990) ("On July 13, 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court held 
that, notwithstanding the certification statute, the Missouri constitution did not grant the Missouri Supreme Court 
original jurisdiction to render opinions on questions of law certified by federal courts and declined to answer the 
certified question.") 
 134 See infra Part III.A. 
21
would be justified.135 In the diversity context, however, the Court has provided little guidance to 
the lower courts regarding the circumstances under which certification is appropriate.     
 A. FEDERAL QUESTION CERTIFICATION 
 The Supreme Court primarily has addressed certification in the context of federal 
constitutional litigation involving state statutes.  The Court has said that "[c]ertification today 
covers territory once dominated by . . . Pullman abstention."136 Thus, the Court has endorsed 
the use of certification in the same circumstances in which it has approved Pullman abstention137 
and has certified questions itself or remanded cases for certification on Pullman grounds.138 
Nevertheless, the Court has distinguished certification from abstention, suggesting that the Court 
 
135 Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997) ("Certification today covers territory once 
dominated by . . . 'Pullman abstention.'"). 
 136 Id. at 75. 
137 E.g., id. at 76 (stating that the availability of certification makes it unnecessary for the parties to institute 
a new lawsuit in state court in order to obtain clarification of "state-law questions antecedent to federal 
constitutional issues").   
 138 See, e.g., Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157, 157-58 (2001) (per curiam) (certifying in a federal habeas 
corpus death penalty case where the district court and court of appeals had interpreted a state rule of criminal 
procedure differently and where under one interpretation the prisoner's constitutional claims would be waived, but 
under the other interpretation the claims could be heard on the merits); see id. at 159-60 (stating that the state 
supreme court's answer to the certified question would "help determine the proper state-law predicate for [the 
Court's] determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in [the] case"); Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 
(1999) (certifying a question in a federal habeas corpus case where interpretation of state law would determine 
whether petitioner's conviction would be set aside); see id. at 29 (stating that the state supreme court's answer to the 
certified question would "help determine the proper state-law predicate for [the Court's] determination of the federal 
constitutional questions raised in [the] case"); Va. v. Am. Booksellers, 484 U.S. 383, 386 (1988) (certifying two 
questions in a First Amendment case where "an authoritative construction of the Virginia statute by the Virginia 
Supreme Court would substantially aid [the Court's] review of [the] constitutional holding [below], and might well 
determine the case entirely"); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 650-51, 661-62 & n.15 (1978) (certifying a question 
of state common law because the constitutional issues could not be resolved without first deciding the state law 
question as to which there were no controlling state law precedents, and there had been no showing that a 
constitutional decision was necessary); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 133, 148 (1976) (remanding for certification 
of state law questions regarding the proper construction of a state statute that was susceptible to "an interpretation 
[that] would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute"); see also Aldrich v. 
Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963). 
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would approve the use of certification in federal question cases other than those that satisfy the 
criteria for Pullman abstention.139 
In its earliest certification case involving a federal constitutional question, Clay v. Sun 
Insurance Co.,140 the Supreme Court appeared to sanction the use of certification to resolve 
unclear issues of state law where Pullman abstention otherwise would be warranted.  In Clay, the 
plaintiff bought an insurance policy from the defendant when he was a citizen of Illinois.141 The 
defendant was licensed to do business in Illinois and several other states, including Florida.142 
The policy provided for world-wide coverage against personal property loss and "required that 
suit on any claim for loss must be brought within twelve months of the discovery of the loss."143 
After the plaintiff bought the policy, he moved to Florida and suffered personal property 
damage.144 The defendant refused to pay, and the plaintiff filed suit in federal court more than 
two years after he discovered his loss.145 The defendant defended, in pertinent part, on the 
ground "that under the time limitation for bringing suit, a restriction concededly valid under 
Illinois law, the suit was barred."146 
The district court applied Florida's "five-year limitation for actions on written contracts," 
and the case went to trial.147 The court of appeals reversed on the ground that application of 
Florida's statute of limitations to a contract made in Illinois violated the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.148 In the process of reaching its decision, the court considered whether 
Florida's statute of limitations applied to the policy.149 The court did not decide "this threshold 
 
139 See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79. 
 140 363 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 141 Id. at 208-09. 
 142 Id. 
143 Id. at 208. 
 144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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question," however, apparently because "it could not, on the available materials, make a 
confident guess how the Florida Supreme Court would construe the statute."150 Instead, the court 
would decide the constitutional issue "that [was] presented only if the statute did apply."151 
Relying on the "doctrine that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law 
in advance of the necessity of deciding it,"152 the Clay Court found that, because resolution of the 
state law issue could have ended the suit, the court of appeals should have decided the state law 
issues first and then, only if necessary, decided the due process issue.153 The Court explained 
that the requirement that courts decide constitutional questions only if necessary is "a well-
settled doctrine . . . which, because it carries a special weight in maintaining proper harmony in 
federal-state relations, must not yield to the claim of the relatively minor inconvenience of 
postponement of decision.”154 The Court ultimately vacated the court of appeals' decision and 
remanded the case for determination of the state law questions.155 
In doing so, the Court recognized that the case involved unclear issues of state law.156 
The Court noted, however, that "[t]he Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, ha[d] dealt with 
the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by 
a statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the 
Supreme Court of Florida for its decision."157 The Court further noted that even where 
certification statutes were unavailable it had "frequently deemed it appropriate, where a federal 
 
147 Id. at 209 & n.2. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
150 Id. at 211-12. 
 151 Id. at 209. 
 152 Id. at 211 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 153 Id. at 209-10. 
 154 Id. at 211-12. 
 155 Id. at 212. 
 156 See id. 
157 Id. 
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constitutional question might be mooted thereby, to secure an authoritative state court's 
determination of an unresolved question of its local law."158 Thus, in a case with facts very 
similar to Pullman,159 the Court seemed to suggest that since Florida had a certification statute, 
the lower court should consider certifying the unclear questions of state law on remand rather 
than engaging in abstention. 
 In contrast, in City of Houston v. Hill160 the Court refused to abstain or certify under 
Pullman. In Hill, the Court faced "the question whether a municipal ordinance that makes it 
unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties is unconstitutionally 
overbroad under the First Amendment.”161 The City asked the Court to abstain under Pullman,
and the Court refused.162 The Court explained that abstention was inappropriate in the case at 
bar because the ordinance at issue was "not susceptible to a limiting construction" that would 
render it constitutional.163 The court rejected the argument that abstention was warranted 
because the state courts had never construed the statute.164 The Court noted first that while the 
state appellate courts had not interpreted the statute, "Houston's Municipal Courts . . . [had] had 
numerous opportunities to narrow the scope of the ordinance."165 The Court also said that even 
where no state court has interpreted a statute, a federal court need not abstain if the statute is 
 
158 Id. (citing Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959); Meredith v. City of 
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943)). 
 159 See supra Part II.A. 
 160 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
 161 Id. at 453. 
 162 Id. at 467, 468. 
 163 Id. at 468.  In reaching its decision, the Court said that it was "particularly reluctant to abstain in cases 
involving facial challenges based on the First Amendment," but "[e]ven if [the] case did not involve a facial 
challenge under the First Amendment, [it] would find abstention inappropriate."  Id. at 467.  In a footnote, the Court 
also commented on the lateness of the City's request for abstention.  Id. at n.16.  The Court noted that the City "did 
not raise the abstention issue until after it had lost on the merits before the panel of the Court of Appeals."  Id. Until 
that point, the City had argued "that the ordinance was both unambiguous and constitutional on its face."  Id. The 
Court said that "[t]hese circumstances undercut the force of the city's argument, but [did] not bar [the Court] from 
considering it."  Id. 
164 Id. at 469-70. 
 165 Id. at 470 ("[W]here municipal courts have regularly applied an unambiguous statute, there is certainly 
no need for a federal court to abstain until state appellate courts have an opportunity to construe it."). 
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unambiguous.166 Thus, the Court concluded, "If [a] statute is not obviously susceptible of a 
limiting construction, then even if the statute has 'never [been] interpreted by a state tribunal . . . 
it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction.'"167 
The Hill Court also emphasized that "[t]he possibility of certification d[id] not change 
[its] analysis."168 The Court noted that "certification . . . is useful in reducing the substantial 
burdens of cost and delay that abstention places on litigants."169 The Court explained, however, 
that certification, like Pullman abstention, is inappropriate "where . . . there is no uncertain 
question of state law whose resolution might affect the pending federal claim."170 Thus, because 
the ordinance in the case at bar was "neither ambiguous nor obviously susceptible of a limiting 
construction," the Court could discern no reason to abstain or certify under Pullman.171 
More recently, in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,172 the Supreme Court 
discussed certification at length in dicta and suggested that the lower courts should have certified 
the state law question at issue based on Pullman abstention principles.  In Arizonans, Arizona 
amended its state constitution to provide that English was "'the official language of the State of 
Arizona' – 'the language of . . . all government functions and actions.'"173 The plaintiff, a state 
employee who spoke both English and Spanish, filed suit in federal court alleging that the 
amendment violated the U.S. Constitution.174 The district court and the Ninth Circuit held that 
 
166 Id. at 469. 
 167 Id. (quoting Harman, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965)). 
 168 Id. at 470. 
 169 Id. 
170 Id. at 471. 
 171 Id. at 470-71; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945 (2000) (refusing to certify in a case 
where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a state abortion statute that had not been construed by the state 
courts because, inter alia, "[c]ertification of a question (or abstention) is appropriate only where the statute is 'fairly 
susceptible' to a narrowing construction" and the statute at issue was not).   
 172 520 U.S. 43 (1997).  
 173 Id. at 48 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 1(1), 1(2)). 
 174 Id. at 50. 
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the amendment was unconstitutional.175 Despite the state Attorney General's request and the fact 
that the Arizona Supreme Court had not interpreted the amendment, the lower courts refused to 
certify the question of the amendment's proper interpretation.176 The lower courts reasoned that 
certification was unwarranted because the language of the amendment was "plain" and "the 
Attorney General's limiting construction unpersuasive."177 
The Supreme Court declared the case moot because the plaintiff had left her job as a state 
employee for a private position during the course of the litigation.178 Nonetheless, the Court 
went on to reprimand the district court and the Ninth Circuit for failing to certify "[g]iven the 
novelty of the question and its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona’s business, plus 
the views of the Attorney General and [the amendment's sponsors]"179 that a limiting 
construction of the statute was possible.180 
Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principles underlying Pullman abstention.181 It 
explained that in order to avoid "premature adjudication of constitutional questions" and 
"friction-generating error," federal courts should be very careful about deciding the 
 
175 Id. at 55, 78. 
 176 Id. at 62. 
 177 Id. at 76. 
 178 Id. at 72.   
 179 Id. at 78. 
 180 Id. The court's discourse on certification is interesting given its decision that the case was moot.  The 
Court did not stop at chastising the lower courts and discussing certification at length in dicta.  The Court went to 
some lengths to ensure that the federal system left no footprints on the state constitutional amendment at issue.  
First, the Court did not simply dismiss the suit.  See id. at 75.  Instead, the Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth 
Circuit and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal.  Id. at 80.  By vacating the Ninth Circuit's 
judgment, the Court effectively erased that court's interpretation of the amendment.  Furthermore, the Court 
specifically stated that it "express[ed] no view on the correct interpretation of" the amendment or its 
constitutionality.  Id. at 48-49.  At the time the federal suit reached the Supreme Court, the question of the proper 
interpretation of the statute was pending before the Arizona Supreme Court.  Id. at 63 n.18.  The state case had been 
stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.  Id. The Supreme Court noted that given its decision, the Arizona 
Supreme Court could "rule definitively on the proper construction" of the amendment.  Id. at 80.  The Court opined 
that once the state supreme court had ruled, "adjudication of any remaining federal constitutional question may 
indeed become greatly simplified."  Id. 
181 See discussion of Pullman supra Part II.A. 
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constitutionality of state statutes that have not been construed by the state's highest court.182 The 
Court said, "'Speculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the absence of 
prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when . . . the state courts stand willing to 
address questions of state law on certification from a federal court.'"183 The Court concluded that 
the district court and the Ninth Circuit should have been more "cautious" in approaching the 
question whether certification was appropriate.184 Thus, the Court endorsed the use of 
certification in a case that otherwise satisfied the criteria for Pullman abstention because it 
involved a state statute that had never been interpreted and might be construed by the state courts 
so as to moot the constitutional issue. 
 Despite the Court's statement that "[c]ertification today covers territory once dominated 
by . . . Pullman abstention"185 and its endorsement of certification in cases, like Arizonans, that 
are similar to Pullman, the Court has not explicitly limited certification in federal question cases 
to federal constitutional litigation.  Moreover, in Arizonans, the Court specifically distinguished 
certification from abstention.  Echoing the "exceptional circumstances" language of the 
abstention doctrines, the Ninth Circuit in Arizonans "found 'no unique circumstances . . . 
militating in favor of certification.'"186 The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit had 
improperly "[b]lend[ed] abstention with certification."187 The Court then stated unequivocally, 
"Novel, unsettled questions of state law, however, not 'unique circumstances,' are necessary 
 
182 Id. at 79. 
 183 Id. at 79 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510 (1985) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 184 Id. at 77. 
 185 Id. at 75.  
 186 Id. at 79 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 187 Id. at 79. 
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before federal courts may avail themselves of state certification procedures."188 It is unclear 
whether the Arizonans Court intended to sanction the use of certification in federal question 
cases whenever "novel, unsettled questions of state law" are involved, regardless of the 
underlying circumstances of the case.  The Court's statement, however, seems to suggest that it 
has opened the door to that interpretation. 
 B. DIVERSITY CERTIFICATION 
 In the diversity context, the Supreme Court has addressed certification in only one case: 
Lehman Brothers v. Schein.189 Lehman involved three shareholders' derivative suits that were 
filed in federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and consolidated on appeal.190 
The district court concluded that Florida law applied to the disputes and that, under Florida law, 
the cases must be dismissed.191 Although the court of appeals found that Florida law was 
unclear, it nonetheless reversed the district court and held that under Florida law the plaintiffs 
could recover.192 
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the cases 
so that the court could "reconsider whether the controlling issue of Florida law should be 
certified to the Florida Supreme Court."193 The Court said that certification seemed "particularly 
appropriate in view of the novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida law."194 
The Court made clear, however, that even where state law is unclear and certification is 
 
188 Id. The Court noted, as it had previously, that certification does not "entail the delay[], expense, and 
procedural complexity that generally attend[s] abstention decisions" and that "[t]aking advantage of certification . . . 
may 'greatly simplif[y]' an ultimate adjudication in federal court."  Id. (quoting Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 151). 
 189 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974). 
 190 Id. at 387. 
 191 Id. at 388-89. 
 192 Id. at 389. 
 193 Id. at 391-92. 
 194 Id. at 391. 
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available, certification is not mandatory.195 Rather, the Court said that the decision whether to 
use certification "in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court."196 
By remanding Lehman for consideration of whether certification was warranted, the 
Supreme Court endorsed the used of certification under the same circumstances in which it had 
rejected abstention in Meredith.197 Meredith, like Lehman was a diversity case that involved 
unclear state law.198 The court of appeals in Meredith dismissed the case because it believed that 
the case should be decided in a state forum.199 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals 
on the ground that abstention is inappropriate where state law is uncertain but where there are no 
exceptional circumstances present.200 As the Lehman Court explained, Meredith "teaches that 
the mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state 
tribunal for the start of another lawsuit."201 Thus, by sanctioning the use of certification in 
Lehman under circumstances in which it would not have approved of abstention, the Court 
implicitly distinguished certification in diversity cases from abstention in diversity cases.  
Furthermore, by specifically stating in Lehman that the difficulty of state law will not support 
sending the parties to state court "for the start of another lawsuit"202 and yet approving 
certification, the Court suggested that certification where state law is unclear is proper precisely 
because it does not require a full round of litigation in state court. 
 
195 Id. at 390-91. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See discussion of Meredith supra Part II.A. 
 198 Meredith, 320 U.S. at 231. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 234-35, 238. 
 201 Lehman, 416 U.S. at 390. 
 202 Id. at 390. 
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IV. CERTIFICATION BY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS IN DIVERSITY CASES 
 Given the Court's suggestion in both federal question and diversity cases that certification 
and abstention are two separate doctrines203 and the Court's apparent endorsement in Lehman of
certification in diversity cases where state law is unclear,204 it would be reasonable to expect that 
federal appellate courts205 would have adopted the "Lehman approach" to certification in 
diversity cases.  Surprisingly, however, the circuits generally have not done so.  Instead, at least 
six of the circuits tend to rely on abstention principles derived from the Thibodaux and Burford 
abstention doctrines to determine when they should certify.206 In particular, these courts require 
"exceptional circumstances" before they will certify.  The First Circuit, on the other hand, takes a 
dual approach to certification, employing both the abstention-based approach and the Lehman 
approach to certification.  Four circuits appear to lean exclusively toward the Lehman 
approach,207 while one circuit, the Tenth, takes an ad hoc approach that is impossible to 
classify.208 In addition, all of the circuits, at times, also consider "secondary" factors in deciding 
whether to certify.209 
203 See supra Part III.A. and B. 
204 See supra Part III.B. 
205 For purposes of this Article, the phrases "federal circuit courts" and "federal appellate courts" refer to 
the First through Eleventh Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit. 
206 See supra Part II.A-C.  The circuits that rely on abstention principles to determine when certification is 
appropriate are the District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh 
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. 
207 These circuits are the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits. 
208 The Tenth Circuit has said, in more than one diversity case, that "certification is appropriate 'where the 
legal question at issue is novel and the applicable state law is unsettled.'"  Enfield v. A.B. Chance Co., 228 F.3d 
1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664, 667 (10th Cir. 1990)); see also Pehle 
v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 897, 900 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005) (same).  In the cases where the court has made 
this statement, however, it has declined to certify.  E.g., id. at 900 n.1 (declining to certify because state law was 
settled); Enfield, 228 F.3d at 1255 (declining to certify because the party "did not seek certification until after it 
received an adverse decision from the district court"); Brown, 920 F.2d at 667 (declining to certify because state law 
was settled).  Thus, these cases do not necessarily indicate that the Tenth Circuit will certify when state law is 
uncertain.   
Furthermore, in discussing certification, the Tenth Circuit has quoted Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 
228 (1943) for the proposition that federal courts have a duty to decide state law issues absent exceptional 
circumstances.  Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Meredith, 320 U.S. at 
235) (reviewing the district court's refusal to certify); see also Enfield, 228 F.3d at 1255) (quoting Copier, 138 F.3d 
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A. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND ABSTENTION-BASED 
CERTIFICATION   
 
The District of Columbia, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits use an 
abstention-based approach to certification.  In deciding whether to certify in diversity cases, 
these circuits commonly ask (1) whether state law is unsettled and (2) whether an interest of 
sufficient importance to the State is involved.  In analyzing the second factor, the circuits are 
concerned about whether considerations of federal-state comity indicate that the issue before 
them is one that warrants certification.  Accordingly, like the Thibodaux and Burford Courts, the 
circuits examine whether the issue is "intimately" related to the state's "sovereign prerogative," 
whether the issue is one of "vital public concern," whether the state has an interest in 
"maintaining uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem," or whether the state 
has an interest in "retaining local control over difficult questions of state law bearing on policy 
problems of substantial public import."210 While the circuits do not often use this precise 
language from the abstention cases to describe the second factor, they do employ very similar 
language and appear to be equating certification with abstention by, in effect, requiring 
exceptional circumstances before they will certify.  For the most part, however, the circuits do 
 
at 838) ("'[U]nder the diversity statutes the federal courts have the duty to decide questions of state law even if 
difficult or uncertain.'").  Confusingly, however, the Tenth Circuit has also recognized that in Arizonans for Official 
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, the Supreme Court said that "[n]ovel, unsettled questions of state law, . . . not 
unique circumstances,' are necessary before federal courts" can certify."  Copier, 138 F.3d at 839 (quoting 
Arizonans, 520 U.S.  at 79).  To complicate matters further, in most, if not all, of its published certification cases, the 
Tenth Circuit has declined to certify for myriad reasons, none of which are related to whether the issue involved is 
sufficiently important to the State.  Given the Tenth Circuit's contradictory statements regarding whether it follows 
the Lehman approach or an abstention-based approach to certification and the lack of case law establishing that it 
follows either method, it is impossible to classify the court's approach.  Due to the lack of diversity cases in which 
the Tenth Circuit has certified, perhaps the most that can be said is that the court is very reluctant to certify and 
views certification with great circumspection.   
209 These factors are (1) whether the issue is or may be dispositive, (2) the likely recurrence of the issue, (3) 
the timing of the request for certification, (4) whether the party requesting certification chose the federal forum, and 
(5) whether the denial of certification will lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the laws.  They 
are "secondary" because the circuits sometimes apply them and sometimes ignore them.  In addition, a factor that 
receives weight in one case may not be mentioned in another case.  The secondary factors are discussed infra Part V. 
210 Supra Part II.C. 
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not acknowledge that they are relying on abstention principles or explain their reasoning for 
taking this approach to certification.   
 The District of Columbia Circuit provides an illustration of the abstention-based 
approach to certification.  The D.C. Circuit certifies where state law is "'genuinely uncertain' 
with respect to the dispositive question and . . . the case 'is one of extreme public importance.'"211 
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Richardson,212 for example, the plaintiff worked as a 
security guard in an apartment complex managed by a District of Columbia company.213 The 
company purchased a comprehensive general liability insurance policy from Nationwide for the 
apartment complex.214 The policy included a pollution exclusion clause which "exclude[d] 
liability coverage for injuries or damage arising out of events involving the release or escape of 
'pollutants.'"215 While the plaintiff worked at the complex, she allegedly was exposed to carbon 
monoxide that leaked from one or more gas furnaces.216 The plaintiff sued the company in state 
court claiming that she was injured from exposure to carbon monoxide fumes.217 Nationwide 
then filed a declaratory judgment action in federal district court in the District of Columbia 
"seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify"218 the company because 
the pollution exclusion clause barred coverage for the plaintiff's alleged injuries.219 The district 
court agreed with Nationwide and granted its motion for summary judgment.220 
211 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 270 F.3d 948, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Dial A Car, Inc. v. 
Transp., Inc., 132 F.3d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  Cf. Karen LeCraft Henderson, Certification: (Over)due 
Deference?, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 637, 638 (1995) (stating that, in the D.C. Circuit, the decision whether to certify 
"usually turns on the clarity of state law"). 
212 270 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
213 Id. at 951. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 950. 
216 Id. at 951. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. at 951-52. 
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit certified the question whether "the pollution exclusion clause 
appl[ied] to injuries arising from alleged carbon monoxide poisoning" to the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals.221 The court reasoned that certification was warranted because 
District of Columbia law was genuinely uncertain: The District of Columbia courts had not 
addressed the scope of the pollution exclusion clause, and other jurisdictions that had interpreted 
similar clauses had reached conflicting conclusions.222 The court further reasoned that it should 
certify because "the question [was] one of significant import to the public."223 The clause was a 
common feature of commercial comprehensive general liability policies, and its interpretation 
therefore "potentially affect[ed] the insurance coverage of most businesses in the District of 
Columbia."224 Thus, in Richardson, the D.C. Circuit essentially applied abstention principles to 
determine whether certification was appropriate.225 
The Second Circuit's approach to certification, like the D.C. Circuit's, demonstrates the 
use of certification as a proxy for abstention in diversity cases.  Interestingly, the Second Circuit 
has stated specifically that certification is proper "only where there is a split of authority on the 
issue, where [a] statute's plain language does not indicate the answer, or when presented with a 
complex question of [state] common law for which no [state] authority can be found."226 This 
 
221 Id. at 950-51. 
222 Id. at 952. 
223 Id. at 950. 
224 Id. 
225 For other diversity cases in which the D.C. Circuit has used abstention principles to decide whether to 
certify, see Dial A Car, Inc., 132 F.3d at 746 (declining to certify the question of whether there was a private right of 
action under a District of Columbia statute because the "precedent regarding implied private rights of action [was] 
reasonably clear" and the case "[was] not one of 'extreme public importance' in the District of Columbia."); Joy v. 
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (certifying a question regarding "the conditions 
under which . . . police officers will be held liable in tort for actions taken in the course of performing their public 
functions" because state law was genuinely uncertain and the case was one of extreme public importance); Eli Lilly 
and Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 876, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (certifying where state law was uncertain and "the 
State . . . ha[d] a very substantial interest in [the] dispute"). 
226 Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1992).  In a case decided five years 
after Riordan the Second Circuit said, "Riordan establishes the standard applicable in this Circuit for determining 
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suggests that the Second Circuit has adopted the Lehman approach to certification in diversity 
cases and asks only whether state law is sufficiently unclear in deciding whether to certify.  
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit usually considers not only whether state law is unclear, but also 
whether the issue involves important state public policy considerations.227 Thus, in deciding 
whether to certify in a diversity case, the Second Circuit actually uses a standard that is similar to 
the D.C. Circuit's that also appears to be derived from abstention principles.228 
Very recently, for example, in Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network,229 the 
Second Circuit certified several "novel questions of [state] statutory interpretation" that involved 
an "important and sensitive area of state law and policy" to the New York Court of Appeals.230 
The plaintiff in Colavito had end-stage renal disease.231 When he did not receive a kidney that 
allegedly had been directly donated to him, he brought suit in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction against the New York Organ Donor Network ("NYODN") and two NYODN 
 
whether it is appropriate to certify a question to a state court."  McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
227 See, e.g., Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, 438 F.3d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Where unsettled 
and significant questions of state law will control the outcome of a case, we may certify those questions.") (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 396 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 2005) (certifying where 
the case involved "unsettled and significant" issues of state law); Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 25-26 (2d Cir. 
2003) ("[I]n deciding whether to certify . . . this Court looks to both the extent of existing state precedent and the 
nature of the questions to be asked.  In particular, whether to certify a question depends to some extent upon whether 
the question implicates issues of state public policy.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); City of 
Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co., 332 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 2003) (certifying questions because the state courts had not 
yet ruled on the issues and because the issues involved "important public policy considerations" for the state); N.Y. 
Univ. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 750, 756 (2d Cir. 2003) (certifying a "significant and novel public policy 
question"). 
228 See, e.g,, DiBella v. Hopkins,, 403 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) ("We do not believe this case presents 
any of the exceptional circumstances that would justify using the certification procedure.") (emphasis added); 
Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that certification is a "valuable device for 
securing prompt and authoritative resolution of unsettled questions of state law, especially those that seem likely to 
recur and to have significance beyond the interests of the parties in a particular lawsuit.").  Cf. Judith S. Kaye & 
Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 
397-422 (2000) (discussing New York's experience with certification). 
229 438 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2006). 
230 Id. at 216, 229. 
231 Id. at 217. 
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officials.232 The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had engaged in fraud and had committed 
the common law tort of conversion by violating New York Public Health Law.233 The plaintiff 
also asserted a private right of action under New York Public Health Law.234 The Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the fraud claim, but 
"reserve[d] decision on the remaining issues" and certified several questions.235 
Specifically, the Second Circuit said that before it reached the merits of the plaintiff's 
other claims, it had to determine whether those claims even existed under state public health 
law.236 After examining the statutory sections at issue, the court concluded that it could not 
determine whether the claims "[gave] rise to enforceable rights for individuals."237 The court 
ultimately held that certification was appropriate because the statutory language was ambiguous, 
and there was very little pertinent case law interpreting the statutory provisions.238 In addition, 
the court reasoned that certification was justified because it did not have the "experience, 
expertise, or authority" to ascertain the public policy underlying the statutes at issue.239 
According to the court, the goal behind the statutes—increasing organ donation—could be 
achieved either by protecting "organ procurement organizations from liability or by giving 
donors and donees enforceable rights to remedy and deter misconduct."240 The court concluded 
that "it would be imprudent to embark on an excursion . . . into the state statutory incentive 
 
232 See id. at 217, 219, 220. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 232-33. 
236 See id. at 223. 
237 Id. at 228. 
238 Id. at 229. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
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structure in this important and sensitive area of state law and policy."241 Therefore, after 
applying abstention principles, the Second Circuit determined that certification was warranted.242 
A case from the Seventh Circuit, Doe v. American National Red Cross,243 provides an 
additional compelling example of a court's tacit use of abstention principles to decide whether to 
certify.244 The Doe court certified the question of "[w]hether a blood bank, sued in negligence 
for failing properly to screen donors and test blood or blood products, is 'a person who is a health 
care provider' within the meaning of the Wisconsin medical malpractice statute of limitations."245 
Using abstention language without citing abstention cases, the court said that certification was 
appropriate because the issue "concern[ed] a matter of vital public concern" and "an appropriate 
respect for the prerogatives and responsibilities of  Wisconsin" required that the state supreme 
court decide the issue.246 The Doe court further reasoned that certification was justified because, 
inter alia, state law was uncertain.247 Thus, the Doe court, like the Richardson and Colavito 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 976 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1992). 
244 While the Seventh Circuit has said that it considers multiple factors in deciding whether to certify, 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, 285 F.3d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 2002), its case law (including Doe) indicates that the court 
primarily considers whether state law is uncertain and whether the issue is sufficiently important to the State.  See, 
e.g., id. at 638-39 (certifying a question about the applicable statute of limitations primarily because the intermediate 
appellate courts were in conflict, the state supreme court "[had] not had an opportunity to address the question 
squarely," and "[s]tatutes of limitations reflect significant policy choices by the state and have grave consequences 
for the administration of justice within the state"); Valerio v. Home Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 226, 229 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(certifying a question regarding the proper interpretation of a phrase in an insurance policy because the answer 
would "control the outcome of [the] appeal;" the state courts had "not yet construed [the] phrase, which [was] 
common to many policies;" and the state had a "significant interest in the interpretation and enforcement of 
insurance policies executed within its borders"); Shirley v. Russell, 69 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1995) (certifying 
where there were no state decisions on point and the question had "important implications for the state"). 
245 Doe, 976 F.2d at 376. 
246 Id. at 374; see Kaiser, 391 U.S. 593, 595 (1968) (finding that the lower courts should have abstained 
because, inter alia, the issue was one of "vital concern" to the state); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (approving abstention because, inter alia, the state law issue was "intimately involved with 
[the state's] sovereign prerogative").  For a detailed discussion of  Kaiser and Thibodaux, see supra Part II.B.  
247 Doe, 976 F.2d at 375.  The Doe court also found that certification was appropriate because allowing the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide the question would "ensure that Wisconsin's public policy [was], from the 
outset, applied evenhandedly to all litigants whether they [found] themselves in a state or federal forum," and the 
answer to the certified question would determine whether the cause of action survived.  Id. at 374; see infra Part V. 
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courts, required "exceptional circumstances," as well as uncertain state law, before it would 
certify.248 
B. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS AND THE LEHMAN APPROACH TO 
CERTIFICATION 
 
1. The Dual Approach to Certification  
 In contrast to the circuits that seem to equate certification with abstention, the First, 
Circuit uses a somewhat schizophrenic approach to certification.  It sometimes applies abstention 
 
248 Like the D.C Circuit, the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have applied abstention 
principles in multiple cases to decide whether certification is justified.   
The Third Circuit has taken a somewhat circuitous route to adopting its certification factors.  Judge Becker 
first wrote in dissent that "a federal court should be authorized to certify a question of law to the state court when: 
(1) the issue is one of importance; (2) it may be determinative of the litigation; and (3) state law does not provide 
controlling precedent through which the federal court could resolve the issue."  Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal 
Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting).  In Hakimoglu, the court faced the question of 
"whether under New Jersey law a casino patron may recover from a casino for gambling losses caused by the 
casino's conduct in serving alcoholic beverages to the patron and allowing the patron to continue to gamble after it 
becomes obvious that the patron is intoxicated."  Id. at 292.  According to Judge Becker, Hakimoglu was a "textbook 
case for certification" because the issue was "determinative of the litigation; important public policy issues [were] at 
stake; and little authority guide[d] [the court's] decision."  Id. at 304.   
Although Judge Becker proposed his certification factors in dissent, the other panel judges, Nygaard and 
Alito, joined the part of Judge Becker's dissent that discussed certification "and enthusiastically endorse[d] his 
recommendations therein."  Id. at 293 n.2.  Nonetheless, certification was not an option in Hakimoglu because the 
case involved New Jersey law and, at that time, New Jersey did not have a certification procedure.  See id. at 304 
(Becker, J., dissenting).  Thus, even though Judges Nygaard and Alito joined the section of Judge Becker's dissent 
on certification to form a majority, Judge Becker's proposed certification factors were merely dicta.   
Since Hakimoglu, however, the Third Circuit appears to have adopted Judge Becker's factors for deciding 
whether certification is proper.  See Travelers Indem. Co. v. DiBartolo, 171 F.3d 168, 169 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(declining to certify because "the issue was neither sufficiently important nor sufficiently difficult to command the 
attention" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court); see also Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 426 F.3d 671, 675 (3d Cir. 
2005) (certifying in a federal question case because it could not "predict with confidence how the [state] Supreme 
Court would decide the issues presented" and because "the questions of law certified [were] of . . . substantial public 
importance").   
For cases demonstrating that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits generally apply abstention principles in diversity 
cases to determine whether certification is warranted, see, e.g., Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P.,
381 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Because the issue whether punitive damages awards are insurable under Texas 
public policy is significant for Texas law and because the Texas intermediate courts have reached competing rulings 
with no definitive guidance from the Supreme Court of Texas, we hereby certify the . . . question."); Free v. Abbott 
Labs, Inc., 164 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that "certification may be advisable where important state 
interests are at stake and the state courts have not provided clear guidance on how to proceed") (citing 
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1992)); Kremen v. Cohen, 325 
F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The certification procedure is reserved for state law questions that present 
significant issues, including those with important public policy ramifications, and that have not yet been resolved by 
the state courts."); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 197 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999) (certifying a question where 
there was "no clearly controlling precedent in the case law of the California appellate courts" and the answer would 
"resolve an important question of insurance law . . . that . . . [was] best determined by the California Supreme Court 
rather than a federal court"). 
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principles to decide whether to certify and, at other times, employs the Lehman approach to 
certification.  For example, the First Circuit has repeatedly stated that "[a]bsent controlling state 
court precedent," it "may certify a state law issue to the state's highest court."249 Moreover, the 
First Circuit often takes the Lehman approach to certification and considers primarily whether 
state law is uncertain in deciding whether to certify.  Thus, in Reagan v. Racal Mortgage, Inc.,250 
the First Circuit certified where the state statute at issue was ambiguous and the statute's 
"interpretive case law"251 did not permit the court to "conclusively determine whether [the 
statute] applie[d] to [the] case."252 Recently, the First Circuit even seemed to recognize the 
distinction between abstention and certification when it stated in a diversity case that abstention 
was inappropriate because exceptional circumstances were not present, but certification was 
available to obtain a proper interpretation of the state statute at issue.253 In some instances, 
however, the First Circuit takes an abstention-based approach to certification in diversity cases 
and asks both whether state law is uncertain and whether the issue is sufficiently "important" to 
warrant certification.254 
2. The Lehman Approach to Certification 
 The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to employ primarily the Lehman 
approach to certification.  Multiple Eleventh Circuit cases demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit, 
 
249 E.g., Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing multiple cases for 
the same proposition). 
250 135 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1998). 
251 Id. at 45. 
252 Id. at 44; see also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1211, 1222 (1st Cir. 
1995) (certifying a question where state law was unclear and the issue was determinative of the appeal). 
253 Sevigny v. Employers Ins., 411 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. 
Committee, 55 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1995) (federal question case) ("While uncertainty or difficulty regarding state 
law is generally not sufficient to justify traditional abstention, it may be enough to counsel certification where that 
procedure is available") (citing Meredith, 320 U.S. 228, and Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974)). 
254 E.g., Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88, 103 (1st Cir. 1999) (certifying a question where 
state law was unclear and the issue to be decided was "quintessentially a policy judgment appropriately made for the 
state by its own courts"); Medical Professional Mut. Ins. Co. v. Breon Labs., 141 F.3d 372, 376 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(certifying where the issue was "sufficiently unclear and important"). 
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more than any other, certifies solely because state law is unclear.255 In contrast to the numerous 
diversity cases in the Eleventh Circuit where the court has taken the Lehman approach to 
certification, there are very few published diversity-based certification cases in the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits.  While making conclusions about the circumstances under which these circuits 
certify is therefore speculative at best, the available case law suggests that they also take the 
Lehman approach to certification.256 
Similarly, while the Eighth Circuit also seems to take the Lehman approach to 
certification,257 there are too few published cases in the Eighth Circuit from which a definitive 
conclusion can be drawn. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit provides an interesting case study 
because, like the First Circuit, it has explicitly distinguished certification from abstention in 
diversity cases.  In deciding whether to certify in Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem. Hosp.,258 for 
example, the Eighth Circuit stated: "[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that certification is not 
the drastic procedure that the Court in Meredith . . . held abstention to be."259 The Hatfield court 
explained that a certification-based stay in the case at bar, in contrast to the abstention-based 
 
255 In its certification cases, the Eleventh Circuit often says: "Where there is doubt in the interpretation of 
state law, a federal court may certify the question to the state supreme court to avoid making unnecessary Erie 
guesses and to offer the state court the opportunity to interpret or change existing law."  Tobin v. Michigan Mut. Ins. 
Co., 398 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing multiple cases for the same proposition).  For examples of 
Eleventh Circuit cases in which the court takes the Lehman approach to certification and considers primarily 
whether state law is unclear in deciding whether to certify, see, e.g., id. at 1274 (certifying where the appeal 
"depend[ed] on resolution of questions of unsettled Florida law and [would] affect many other cases"); Miller v. 
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 678, 678 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("Because there is no controlling Florida 
authority on this question, we certify this issue to the Florida Supreme Court."); Freeman v. First Union Nat'l, 329 
F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (certifying where there was "no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the 
state's highest court" and the "unanswered questions of state law" were "determinative of [the] appeal"). 
256 See, e.g., C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd., 306 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2002) (certifying where state law 
uncertain); Langley v. Pierce, 993 F.2d 36, 37-38 (4th Cir. 1993) (certifying where there was "no controlling 
precedent in [state] law that addresse[d] the exact controversy between the parties"); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro 
Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[r]esort to the certification procedure is most 
appropriate when the question is new and state law is unsettled" and declining to certify because the pertinent case 
law was "relatively settled"). 
257 See, e.g., Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 112 F.3d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1997) (certifying where 
there was no "controlling precedent in the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court which would enable [the] 
court to reach a sound decision without indulging in speculation or conjecture"). 
258 701 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc). 
259 Id. at 1268. 
40
dismissal in Meredith, "would not deprive [it] of jurisdiction, []or . . . force the parties into state 
court, but rather would afford the parties a state forum for a state law question which process 
may obviate further extensive consideration by this court."260 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit 
has said that while Meredith prevents federal courts from declining to exercise their jurisdiction 
in diversity cases solely because state law is difficult to determine, certification may solve the 
problem of ascertaining unclear state law in such cases.261 
Thus, in contrast to all of the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit has not only differentiated 
between certification and abstention but has attempted to explain its rationale for doing so: 
certification, unlike abstention, does not require a federal court to surrender its jurisdiction or 
force the parties into state court for a full round of litigation there.  Instead, certification merely 
permits a state's highest court to decide a question of law.   
 
V. WHY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS NEED NOT EMPLOY ABSTENTION 
 PRINCIPLES TO LIMIT THE CERTIFICATION OF STATE-LAW QUESTIONS IN 
 DIVERSITY CASES 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 As Part IV demonstrates, many of the federal circuits essentially have equated 
certification with abstention in diversity cases.  While they recognize that certification is 
procedurally distinct from abstention in that certification does not require remitting the parties to 
state court for the start of another lawsuit, they fail to recognize any substantive distinction 
 
260 Id. Interestingly, even though the Hatfield court distinguished certification from abstention, the court 
still seemed to consider whether exceptional circumstances were present in deciding whether to certify the question 
before it.  Thus, the Hatfield court reasoned that certification was appropriate not only because state law was unclear 
but also because "the public policy aims involved in the statutes at issue [were] conflicting."  Id. at 1267.  The court 
also reasoned that certification was proper because a case involving the same statutes and issues was before the state 
supreme court.  Id. at 1268.   
261 Guillard v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20, 24-25 (8th Cir. 1973) (remanding to the 
district court with directions to certify an unclear question of state law if necessary). 
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between the two doctrines and offer no explanation for their use of abstention principles to 
determine whether they should certify.   
 Because the circuits do not explain their rationale for equating certification with 
abstention in diversity cases, the reasons for this failure are indeterminate.  Nevertheless, several 
possibilities suggest themselves.  First, because certification and abstention are both devices for 
resolving unclear issues of state law, it is possible that the circuits simply have inferred that 
abstention principles should be used to determine whether certification is warranted.  Second, 
given the Supreme Court's relative silence regarding certification in diversity cases,262 the 
circuits may have taken their cue from the Supreme Court's use and endorsement of certification 
in Pullman abstention cases.263 Because the Supreme Court has suggested that certification is 
proper in federal question cases where Pullman abstention previously would have been 
justified,264 the circuits may assume that certification in diversity cases is proper only where the 
Court has approved abstention in diversity cases.  Finally, the circuits may reason that federal 
courts abdicate their duty to exercise their jurisdiction when they certify in diversity cases.  
Accordingly, the circuits may have concluded that certification (like abstention) is warranted 
only where exceptional circumstances are present. 
 Regardless of the reasons for the circuits' application of abstention principles to 
certification questions, the question that has not been answered is whether federal courts must 
employ abstention principles to limit the certification of state-law questions in diversity cases.  
This Part argues that they need not.  First, this Part contends that the Supreme Court has never 
limited certification in federal question or diversity cases to exceptional circumstances, and 
therefore the lower courts are not compelled to do so.  Second, this Part maintains that the 
 
262 See supra Part III.B. 
263 See supra Part III.A. 
264 See supra Part III.A; see, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997). 
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decision whether to certify should not turn on the presence of exceptional circumstances because 
certification does not result in abdication of the duty to exercise jurisdiction.  Instead, when a 
federal court certifies a question of law to a state's highest court, it merely postpones the exercise 
of its jurisdiction. Thus, there is no reason for federal courts to use the exceptional circumstances 
requirement of the abstention doctrines to restrict the use of certification. 
 
B. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT LIMITED CERTIFICATION TO EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN FEDERAL QUESTION OR DIVERSITY CASES 
 
While there is no question that the majority of Supreme Court cases addressing 
certification involve Pullman-type constitutional litigation and unclear state law,265 the Court has 
never explicitly limited federal question certification to cases in which Pullman abstention 
previously would have been appropriate.  Indeed, the Arizonans Court unambiguously 
distinguished certification from abstention when it chided the Ninth Circuit for blending the two 
doctrines.266 Additionally, the Arizonans Court suggested that unsettled questions of state law, 
and not exceptional circumstances, are the only condition on certification.267 More importantly, 
in Lehman, a diversity case, the Court approved of certification where state law was unsettled but 
no exceptional circumstances were present.268 In so doing, the Court implicitly recognized that 
certification in diversity cases need not be limited by abstention principles. 
 Thus, the Supreme Court has distinguished certification from abstention in both the 
federal question and diversity contexts.  Furthermore, in both types of cases the Court has 
indicated that the only prerequisite for certification is unclear state law.  Consequently, the lower 
 
265 See supra Part III.A. 
266 See supra Part III.A; see Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 79. 
267 See supra Part III.A. 
268 See supra Part III.B; Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). 
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federal courts should not regard Supreme Court precedent as permitting certification only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
 
C. CERTIFICATION NEED NOT BE LIMITED TO EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE FEDERAL COURTS DO NOT ABDICATE THEIR 
STRICT DUTY TO EXERCISE THEIR JURISDICTION WHEN THEY CERTIFY. 
 
1. Abstention-Based Stays, Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction, and the 
Exceptional Circumstances Requirement 
 
The Supreme Court has said that when a federal court remands a removed case to state 
court or dismisses a case outright on abstention grounds, the court abdicates its strict duty to 
exercise its jurisdiction.269 Thus, the Court has authorized abstention-based remands and 
dismissals only in exceptional circumstances where considerations of federal-state comity 
require deference to another sovereign.270 The Court also has said that when a federal court stays 
its proceedings on abstention grounds in a diversity case, it does not abdicate its strict duty to 
exercise its jurisdiction.271 Instead, the federal court merely postpones the exercise of its 
jurisdiction until the state courts resolve a question of state law involved in the case.272 Even 
though the Court has opined that abstention-based stays do not result in the abdication of duty, 
however, the Court nevertheless has sanctioned abstention-based stays, like abstention-based 
remands and dismissals, only in exceptional circumstances.273 
Because a federal court allegedly does not abdicate its duty when it grants an abstention-
based stay, there is no apparent reason that such stays should be limited to exceptional 
circumstances in diversity cases.  The Court itself has offered no direct justification for this 
 
269 See supra Part II.A.; Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996). 
270 See supra Parts II.A, II.B, & II.C. 
271 See supra Part II.B.; Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721. 
272 See supra Part II.B. 
273 See supra Parts II.B. & II.C. 
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contradiction.274 One possible explanation for the Court's inconsistency, however, is that the 
Court implicitly recognizes that an abstention-based stay in a diversity case is the equivalent of 
an abstention-based remand or dismissal and effectively results in a federal court's abdication of 
its duty to exercise its jurisdiction.275 Therefore, because the consequences of abstention-based 
remands, dismissals and stays in diversity cases are the same, the Court has imposed the 
exceptional circumstances requirement on abstention-based stays to limit their use to those 
circumstances in which it has approved abstention-based remands and dismissals.  By doing so, 
the Court has ensured that the lower courts are faithful to Meredith and do not abdicate their duty 
by granting abstention-based stays simply because state law is difficult to ascertain or unclear.276 
The Court's unwillingness to explicitly acknowledge the equivalency of abstention-based 
remands, dismissals and stays in the diversity abstention context can be attributed to the historic 
inability of courts to decline to exercise their jurisdiction in suits at law.277 Because courts 
historically lacked the discretionary power to dismiss damages actions, federal courts today 
likewise cannot remand or dismiss suits for damages on abstention grounds.278 If they do, they 
 
274 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1891, 1899 (2004) 
(noting the contradiction created by "the Court's distinction between the dismissal or remand of a federal action, 
which the Court prohibits, and the stay of the action, which the Court suggests might be justified"). 
 275 Professors Richard Fallon, David Shapiro, and Daniel Meltzer recognize the "functional similarity" 
between abstention-based stays and abstention-based remands and dismissals in their casebook when they ask: "'If 
the federal action is stayed pending resolution of the state action, won't the state court's determination be dispositive 
of the federal action under doctrines of claim and issue preclusion?  If so, isn't the practical effect of a stay identical 
to that of an order dismissing the federal action?"  Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1891, 1900 (2004) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart & 
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1193 (5th ed. 2003)); see also Lewis Yelin, Burford 
Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1871, 1899 (1999) ("If the distinction between a stay and a 
dismissal is to have much significance, however, the Court will have to revise the application of the traditional 
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion with regard to the claims remaining before the federal court.  Otherwise, the 
parties will be barred from relitigating the claim or any issues necessary for deciding the claim in the federal 
court."); id. at 1908 ("If the Court does not modify the preclusive effect of the state court judgment, or if it gives the 
state proceedings only collateral estoppel effect, then the federal court's stay will be functionally indistinguishable 
from dismissal since the effect of the stay 'is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a 
state forum.'") (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 450 U.S. 1, 11 n.11 (1983)). 
276 See supra Part II.A. 
277 See supra Part II.B. 
278 See supra Parts II.B. & II.C. 
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improperly abdicate their duty to exercise their jurisdiction when it is properly invoked.279 In 
order to permit abstention in damages actions, therefore, the Court necessarily reasoned in cases 
like Thibodaux that a stay does not constitute abdication by a federal court of its duty to decide 
the case before it.280 The Court concluded instead that a stay is merely a postponement of the 
exercise of jurisdiction.281 By creating the fiction that federal courts sitting in diversity merely 
delay the exercise of their jurisdiction when they grant abstention-based stays, the Court was 
able to justify extending abstention principles to suits at law.  At the same time, however, by 
limiting abstention-based stays to exceptional circumstances the Court silently acknowledged 
that, for all practical purposes, federal courts surrender their jurisdiction when they grant 
abstention-based stays in diversity cases.   
 While the Court has not openly recognized that abstention-based stays are functionally 
equivalent to abstention-based remands and dismissals in its major decisions approving or 
rejecting abstention, it has done so in the context of deciding whether an abstention-based stay 
order is a "final order" that is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.282 Thus, in Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,283 the Court held that an abstention-based 
stay order was "final" for the purposes of § 1291 because it put the plaintiff "'effectively out of 
court'" and therefore "amount[ed] to a dismissal of the suit."284 
In Moses H. Cone, a hospital and a construction company entered into a contract which 
provided, in pertinent part, that certain disputes "could be submitted by either party to binding 
 
279 See supra Parts II.B. & II.C. 
280 See supra Part II.B. 
281 See supra Part II.B. 
282 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the 
Supreme Court." 
283 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
284 Id. at 2, 10. 
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arbitration."285 Eventually, the construction company informed the hospital that it had claims for 
"delay and impact costs."286 The hospital then filed a declaratory judgment action in state court 
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the company had no right to arbitration under the 
contract.287 The company in turn filed suit in federal district court under diversity jurisdiction 
"seeking an order compelling arbitration."288 Relying on Colorado River Water Conservation 
District v. United States, the district court stayed the federal action "pending resolution of the 
state-court suit because the two suits involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of the 
[company's] claims."289 The company then appealed the district court's stay order.290 The Fourth 
Circuit heard the case en banc and "held that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291."291 The Court of Appeals then reversed the stay order, remanded the case to the 
district court, and instructed the district court to enter an arbitration order.292 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the district court's stay order was a "final 
decision" and therefore was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.293 The Court explained that 
because the federal and state suits involved the same issue, the district court's "stay of the federal 
suit pending resolution of the state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the 
federal forum; the state court's judgment on the issue would be res judicata."294 The Court 
reasoned that because "the sole purpose and effect of the stay [was] precisely to surrender 
 
285 Id. at 4. 
286 Id. at 6.  Specifically, the company's claims were "for extended overhead or increase in construction 
costs due to delay or inaction by the [h]ospital."  Id. 
287 Id. at 7. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 7, 13. 
290 Id. at 8.   
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 8-9.   
294 Id. at 10. 
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jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court," it was functionally a dismissal.295 Thus, the district 
court's stay order was final and appealable.   
 The Moses H. Cone Court made clear that its decision did not apply to all stay orders but 
was limited "to cases where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar doctrine) the 
object of the stay is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state 
forum."296 
In the course of its decision, the Moses H. Cone Court also rejected the argument that an 
abstention-based stay is distinguishable from an abstention-based dismissal because a stay can be 
re-opened by a party upon "a showing that the state suit has failed to adjudicate its rights."297 
The Court said that regardless of whether a case is dismissed or stayed on abstention grounds, 
 
295 See id. at 10 n.11 ("We hold . . . that a stay order is final when the sole purpose and effect of the stay is 
precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court."); see also id. at 28 ("[A] stay is as much a refusal 
to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal.").  The Moses H. Cone Court relied on Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. 
Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962), in reaching its conclusion that the stay order at issue was a "final decision" for 
purposes of § 1291.  Id. at 9.  The Court explained that in Idlewild, a district court "stayed [a] federal suit under the 
Pullman abstention doctrine."  Id. The Idlewild Court "held that the District Court's action was final and therefore 
reviewable by the Court of Appeals."  Id. The Idlewild Court reasoned that the stay was final and therefore 
appealable because it put the "'[a]ppellant . . . effectively out of court.'"  Id. (quoting Idlewild, 370 U.S. at 715 n.2).  
The Moses H. Cone Court said that "the argument for finality of the District Court's order [was] even clearer" in 
Moses H. Cone than in Idlewild because "[a] district court stay pursuant to Pullman abstention is entered with the 
expectation that the federal litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court on 
state-law grounds."  Id. at 10.  In contrast, the stay order in  Moses H. Cone "meant that there would be no further 
litigation in the federal forum; the state court's judgment on the issue would be res judicata."  Id. 
The Court faced a similar issue in Quackenbush, where the defendant removed a diversity case to federal 
court and the district court remanded the case to state court under Burford. 517 U.S. at 709-10.  The Court held that 
abstention-based remand orders are appealable as "final decisions" under § 1291 and, in the process, affirmed Moses 
H. Cone. Id. at 712-15.  The Court reasoned that the remand order before it in Quackenbush was "in all relevant 
respects indistinguishable from the stay order [it] found to be appealable in Moses H. Cone."  Id. at 714.  Like the 
stay order in Moses H. Cone, the remand order "put[] the litigants . . . 'effectively out of court' and its effect [was] 
'precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.'" Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 11 
n.11).  The Court noted that the remand order actually was "more 'final'" than the stay order because "[w]hen a 
district court remands a case to a state court, the district court disassociates itself from the case entirely, retaining 
nothing of the matter on the federal court's docket."  Id. The Court concluded that "because the District Court's 
remand order [was] functionally indistinguishable from the stay order . . . in Moses H. Cone . . .  it [was] 
appealable."  Id. at 715. 
Interestingly, however, "in discussing the merits of the remand, the majority simply breezed by the 
persuasive demonstration in Moses H. Cone that an abstention-based stay did not differ in substance from an 
abstention-based dismissal."  Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1891, 
1900 (2004); see supra note 122 (explaining the Quackenbush Court's rationale for concluding that Burford 
abstention was inappropriate on the facts of the case). 
296 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10. 
297 Id. at 27. 
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the federal courts would "remain open" to a party "who later demonstrated the inadequacy of the 
state forum."298 Thus, the fact that stayed proceedings can be reopened did not demonstrate "any 
genuine difference between a stay and a dismissal."299 
The abstention-based stay granted by the district court in Thibodaux is very similar to the 
stay in Moses H. Cone, and like the stay in Moses H. Cone, was functionally a dismissal.  In 
Thibodaux, the plaintiff sued to appropriate property from the defendant under a state eminent 
domain statute.300 The defendant removed the suit to federal court under diversity jurisdiction 
and sought compensation for the taking.301 The district court stayed the federal proceedings and 
remitted the parties to state court to obtain an authoritative answer to the question of whether the 
statute permitted the taking at issue.302 In upholding the stay, the Thibodaux Court emphasized 
that the district court had merely postponed the exercise of its jurisdiction.303 To shore up this 
contention, the Court said that if the state courts found that the taking was permitted, then the 
parties would return to federal court for a determination of damages.304 In addition, the Court 
noted that if the parties did not file suit in state court in a timely fashion, the district court could 
assert its jurisdiction and decide the case itself.305 
Like the two suits in Moses H. Cone, the federal and state suits in Thibodaux involved the 
same issue: whether the state eminent domain statute at issue permitted the taking.  As in Moses 
H. Cone, once the state courts resolved the statutory interpretation in Thibodaux, there would be 
no further litigation on that issue in the federal court because the state court's judgment on the 
issue would be res judicata.  If the state courts found that the taking was not permitted, the 
 
298 Id. at 28. 
299 Id. 
300 See supra Part II.B.; La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 (1959). 
301 See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 26. 
302 See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 26. 
303 See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29. 
304 See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 43 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
305 See supra Part II.B.; Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29. 
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federal suit would be over.  Even if the state courts found that the taking was permitted and the 
parties returned to federal court, however, the only task left for the federal court would be to 
award compensation.  Thus, the object of the stay in Thibodaux was to require an essential part 
of the suit to be litigated in state court. 306 Moreover, like the effect of the Moses H. Cone stay, 
the effect of the Thibodaux stay was to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to state court.  
While the Thibodaux Court stressed that the stay was simply a postponement of jurisdiction, it 
was, like the stay in Moses H. Cone, functionally a dismissal.307 The Thibodaux defendant, as 
much as the Moses H. Cone plaintiff, was effectively out of federal court.    
 Because the stay in Thibodaux was functionally a dismissal, the Court's statement in 
Thibodaux that the district court postponed its jurisdiction when it granted the stay (and the 
Court's later statements in Quackenbush to the same effect)308 are, at a minimum, suspect.  It is 
more likely that the Court recognized that the stay in Thibodaux was, for all intents and purposes, 
a dismissal, but also understood that an abstention-based remand was not possible in a diversity 
suit for damages.  To avoid the improper abdication of the duty to exercise jurisdiction and, at 
the same time, allow for deference to another sovereign where necessary, the Thibodaux and 
 
306 As one commentator has explained, "In [diversity cases] . . . a federal court's decision to stay federal 
proceedings to permit adjudication of the case in state court will have virtually the same effect as a dismissal.  Even 
if the state proceeding is limited to a declaratory judgment action, there may be little or nothing left for the federal 
court to do after the state court renders its judgment.  If the state court resolves a state-law claim against the plaintiff 
or a state-law defense in favor of the defendant, then the federal court need only dismiss the case or perhaps enter 
judgment in favor of the defendant.  If, on the other hand, the state court rules in favor of the plaintiff, then the 
federal court is at most required to consider the appropriate remedy."  Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of 
the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459, 1528-29 (1997). 
307 The ability of the district court in Thibodaux to lift the stay and adjudicate the case if necessary, like the 
ability of a party to reopen a stay in Moses H. Cone, does not demonstrate that there is a difference between a stay 
and a dismissal in this context.   
308 See supra Part II.B; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1891, 1899 (2004) (discussing the "practical effect" of a stay in cases like Quackenbush).  As Professor 
Meltzer has explained, "In a case like Quackenbush, the practical effect of a stay may be not merely to postpone, but 
to permanently prevent, the federal court litigation.  For even if the plaintiff re-filed a state court action, the 
defendant could remove that action too and presumably have it stayed as well.  Even where a stay might permit a 
litigant to re-file successfully in state court without facing the prospect of removal – as might be true where the only 
basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity and the suit is against an in-state defendant – the stay's effect is likely to be 
no different in the end than that of a dismissal."  Id. at 1899-1900. 
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Quackenbush Courts thus approved of abstention-based stays in diversity suits only where 
exceptional circumstances are present.   
2. Certification-Based Stays, Postponement of the Exercise of Jurisdiction, and the 
Exceptional Circumstances Requirement 
 
In contrast to abstention-based stays, certification-based stays need not be based on 
exceptional circumstances because a federal court does not abdicate its duty to exercise its 
jurisdiction when it certifies.  Certification-based stays, unlike abstention-based stays, actually 
result in the postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction rather than the surrender of jurisdiction 
to a state court.   
 When a federal court grants an abstention-based stay, it remits the parties to state court 
for a full round of litigation there.  The parties begin in a state trial court and must pursue the 
litigation as far as possible in state court.  Consequently, abstention-based stays "require federal 
courts to relinquish all three functions" that they "perform when they adjudicate cases: law 
declaration, fact identification, and law application."309 In other words, a federal court abdicates 
its duty to exercise its jurisdiction when it grants an abstention-based stay.   
 On the contrary, when a federal court grants a certification-based stay, it asks the highest 
court of a state to answer a question of state law.  When the state's high court answers the 
question, it returns the case to the federal court.  The federal court then lifts the stay and 
adjudicates the controversy before it.  Certification, therefore, "generally requires federal courts 
to cede only one . . . function[]—law declaration.  Federal courts remain free to undertake 
necessary fact identification both before and after certification, and to apply relevant principles 
 
309 Clark, supra note 306, at 1551; see Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and 
Congress's Power to Direct State Judicial Action: Congress's Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified 
Questions of State Law, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 649, 657 (1999) (stating that when a federal court abstains, it severs itself 
from the case, leaving the state to make an independent determination of the state law issues") (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
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of state law to the facts once the highest state court has supplied the necessary rules of 
decision."310 Thus, certification "enables the federal court to 'participate[] in the resolution of the 
entire case by framing the state law questions [and] specifying relevant facts and legal issues.'"311 
In other words, when a federal court certifies it delays the exercise of its jurisdiction, but it does 
not abdicate its duty to exercise its jurisdiction.  
 In Lehman Brothers v. Schein, the only diversity case where the Supreme Court has 
addressed certification, the Court itself indicated that certification-based stays need not be 
limited to exceptional circumstances because they do not involve the abdication of duty.312 The 
Lehman Court remanded a case to the court of appeals for consideration of whether certification 
was appropriate given the novelty of the issue and the unsettled state of Florida law.313 The case 
involved a run-of-the-mill shareholder's derivative suit and there was no suggestion that 
exceptional circumstances were present.314 In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that it 
had reversed an abstention-based dismissal in Meredith on facts very similar to those in 
Lehman.315 The Lehman Court explained that, under Meredith, "the mere difficulty in 
ascertaining [state] law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for the start of 
 
310 Id.; see Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem. Hosp., 701 F.2d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (stating 
"that certification is not the drastic procedure that the Court in Meredith . . . held abstention to be" and reasoning 
that "certification would not deprive [it] of jurisdiction, []or . . . force the parties into state court, but rather would 
afford the parties a state forum for a state law question which process may obviate further extensive consideration"); 
see also England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (discussing, in the Pullman abstention 
context, "the benefit of a federal trial court's role in constructing a record and making fact findings" and explaining 
that "[h]ow the facts are found will often dictate the decision of federal claims"). 
 311 Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress's Power to Direct State Judicial 
Action: Congress's Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State Law, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 
649, 657 (1999) (quoting John A. Scanelli, Note, The Case for Certification, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 627, 641 
(1971); see also Gerald M. Levin, Inter-jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative 
Judicial Federalism, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 344, 350 (1963) ("[B]y abstaining, a federal court temporarily – if it has 
stayed the action -- . . . severs itself from the case, leaving the state court to make an independent determination of at 
least the state law issue. . . . In inter-jurisdictional certification, however, the federal court actively participates in the 
resolution of the entire case by framing the state law question, specifying the relevant facts and legal issues, and 
certifying directly to the state's highest court."). 
312 See supra Part III.B. 
313 See supra Part III.B.; Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974). 
314 See supra Part III.B. 
315 See supra Part III.B. 
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another lawsuit."316 The problem in Meredith, of course, was that the lower court abdicated its 
duty to exercise its jurisdiction by sending the parties to state court for a new lawsuit absent 
exceptional circumstances.317 The Lehman Court seemed to suggest, however, that ascertaining 
state law through certification, despite the absence of exceptional circumstances, is not 
problematic because the federal court is merely postponing the exercise of its jurisdiction rather 
than abdicating its duty altogether.318 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Lehman lends further support to the argument 
that certification-based stays constitute a postponement of the jurisdictional duty rather than its 
abdication.  Rehnquist concurred in Lehman in order "to emphasize the scope of the discretion of 
federal judges in deciding whether to use  . . . certification procedures.”319 He first explained 
that cases like Meredith and Thibodaux "deal[] with the issue of how to reconcile the exercise of 
the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon the federal courts with the important 
considerations of comity and cooperative federalism which are inherent in a federal system."320 
Rehnquist placed certification, however, “[a]t the other end of the spectrum."321 He suggested 
that the decision whether to certify, unlike the decision whether to abstain, does not involve 
deciding whether exceptional circumstances exist such that the abdication of duty is 
warranted.322 Instead, Rehnquist compared the use of certification by a federal court in a 
 
316 Lehman, 416 U.S. at 390-91 (emphasis added). 
317 See supra Part III.B. 
318 See supra Part III.B. 
319 415 U.S. at 392 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
320 Id. at 393-94 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
321 See id. at 394 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
322 See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[I]n a purely diversity case such as this one, the use of such a 
procedure is more a question of the considerable discretion of the federal court in going about the decisionmaking 
process than it is a question of a choice trenching upon the fundamentals of our federal-state jurisprudence."). 
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diversity case to "researching a point of state law" and described it as simply part of the 
"decisionmaking process."323 
Justice Rehnquist's language in his Lehman concurrence certainly suggests that he did not 
view certification-based stays as involving the surrender of jurisdiction to a state court and the 
abdication of the duty to exercise jurisdiction.  On the contrary, Rehnquist's language indicates 
that he viewed the decision whether to certify as one step out of many that a federal court takes 
in adjudicating a controversy.  This in turn implies that Rehnquist saw certification for what it is: 
a postponement of the exercise of jurisdiction that need not be based on exceptional 
circumstances. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Over ten years ago a federal judge wrote, "Federal courts evince no clear understanding 
of when, how, or even why to certify . . . ."324 This Article has attempted to demonstrate that the 
federal circuit courts remained confused about the appropriate use of certification in diversity 
cases.  More specifically, this Article has argued that several of the federal circuits mistakenly 
equate certification with abstention in diversity cases because they incorrectly view certification 
as an abdication rather than a postponement of the duty to exercise jurisdiction.  These circuits 
focus on whether state law is unclear and whether there are exceptional circumstances that 
warrant certification.   
 Instead of focusing on exceptional circumstances, however, the federal courts should 
consider turning their full attention to other factors that are highly relevant to the certification 
decision.  For example, certification, like abstention, results in costs to both the federal and state 
 
323 See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 324 Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 677, 691 (1995). 
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court systems and the litigants in terms of both delay and expense.  More importantly, a federal 
court's decision not to certify when state law is unsettled raises the Erie325 specter of both forum 
shopping and inequitable administration of the laws.  While the circuits do sometimes consider 
factors such as these in deciding whether to certify, they do so very inconsistently.326 Indeed, it 
is impossible to identify the precise circumstances under which a federal court will consider 
factors other than the clarity of state law and the presence of exceptional circumstances.   
 It is a "bedrock fact" that only a state's highest court "can render an authoritative 
interpretation of that sovereign's laws."327 Given this fact, federal courts can cause multiple 
problems when they unnecessarily decide questions of state law.328 Thus, the federal courts 
should stop needlessly limiting certification in diversity cases and at least begin the process of 
clarifying when, how and why certification is appropriate.    
 
325 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).  The Supreme Court has identified the prevention of 
forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws as the "twin aims of Erie."  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 
U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 326 The factors that the circuits sometimes consider are (1) whether the issue is or may be dispositive, (2) 
the likely recurrence of the issue, (3) the timing of the request for certification, (4) whether the party requesting 
certification chose the federal forum, and, from time to time, 95) whether the denial of certification will lead to 
forum shopping or inequitable administration of the laws.  See, e.g., Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State Law in 
Federal Court, 41 Gonz. L. Rev. 237, 249-55 (2005-2006) (discussing criticisms of certification); Bradford R. 
Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1459, 1557-64 (1997) (discussing some of these factors). 
 327 Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State 
Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 12111237-38 (2004). 
 328 Id. (describing the problems that federal courts can cause when they decide questions of state law, 
including forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law). 
